Knowing the unknowns :

مرکز و کتابخانه مطالعات اسلامی به زبان های اروپایی

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" Knowing the unknowns : "
Gandrud, Christopher

Document Type	:	Latin Dissertation
Record Number	:	1098702
Doc. No	:	TLets550726
Main Entry	:	Gandrud, Christopher
Title & Author	:	Knowing the unknowns :\ Gandrud, Christopher
College	:	London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
Date	:	2012
student score	:	2012
Degree	:	Ph.D.
Abstract	:	How do policymakers make decisions during ﬁnancial market uncertainty? I develop a straightforward framework of policymaking in uncertainty. To overcome uncertainty, policymakers gather information using strategies discussed across a variety of political science disciplines. Policymakers need information to be able to make goal-oriented decisions. The information strategies actors choose are conditioned on the uncertainty problems they face. In turn, the information they receive impacts their policy decisions. My three empirical papers investigate what strategies are likely to be chosen in diﬀerent types of uncertainty and how these choices aﬀect policy decisions. My ﬁrst paper, co-written with Mícheál O’Keeﬀe, develops a signaling game that policymakers play when they perceive data uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty about economic fundamentals. The model is supported empirically with analytic narratives of recent crises in Korea and Ireland. My following two papers deal with situations of increasing causal uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty about how actions cause outcomes. In both of these papers I use Multi-state Event History Analysis. I ﬁnd that when there is high causal uncertainty policymakers tend to use learning strategies that start with international-level policy recommendations. These recommendations are then updated with the experiences of regional peers who have adopted them. Beyond creating and ﬁnding evidence for a parsimonious framework of decisionmaking in uncertainty, I make a number of other contributions to political economy. I extend the empirical tools researchers can use to understand decisions in complex choice environments. I provide evidence that making ﬁnancial bureaucrats “independent" does not ensure positive outcomes. Speciﬁcally, it does not guarantee that ﬁnancial bureaucrats will provide accurate information needed for eﬀective policymaking.
Subject	:	JC Political theory
Added Entry	:	London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)