| Document Type
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BL
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| Record Number
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1019546
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| Doc. No
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b773916
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| Main Entry
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Schueler, G. F.
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| Title & Author
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Reasons and purposes : : human rationality and the teleological explanation of action /\ G.F. Schueler.
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| Publication Statement
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Oxford :: Clarendon Press ;New York :: Oxford University Press,, 2003.
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| Page. NO
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xii, 174 pages ;; 23 cm
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| ISBN
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0199250375
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: 9780199250370
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| Bibliographies/Indexes
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Includes bibliographical references (pages 166-171) and index.
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| Contents
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1. 1. Purposes, Causes, and Reasons Explanations Purposes -- 2. Reasons and Causes -- 3. Causes and Causal Explanations -- 4. 2. Non Telelogical Explanations of Actions The Argument for 'The Humean Theory of Motivation' -- 5. Are 'Causal' Explanations Unavoidable? -- 6. 3. Teleological Explanations of Actions The Need for Teleological Explanaations -- 7. Character Traits -- 8. 4. Explaining in Terms of the Agent's Reasoning Problems with the Practical Syllogism -- 9. Practical Reasoning and the Explanation of Actions -- 10. Practical Reasoning and Evaluations -- 11. The Principle of Charity -- 12. 5. The Inherently Normative Nature of Action Explanations Normative Explanations I: The Deliberative Model -- 13. Normative Explanations II: The Agent's Perspective.
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| Abstract
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"People do things for reasons. But philosophers have disagreed sharply about how 'reasons explanations' of actions actually work and hence about their implications for human freedom and autonomy. The dominant view in contemporary philosophy is the (Humean) idea that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do." "G. F. Schueler seeks to replace such causal views, arguing that they leave out two essential elements of these explanations. Reasons explanations are inherently teleological in the sense that the agent's reasons always explain the purpose for which he acted. They are also inherently normative since it is always possible that an agent's reasons for doing something are not good reasons. Schueler argues that causal accounts of reasons explanations make no sense of either of these features; he argues instead for an account based on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept."--Jacket.
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| Subject
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Intentionality (Philosophy)
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Practical reason.
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Intentionnalité (Philosophie)
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| Subject
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Raison pratique.
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| Subject
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08.36 philosophical anthropology, philosophy of psychology.
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| Subject
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Handlungstheorie
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Intentionality (Philosophy)
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Intentionality (Philosophy)
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| Subject
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Practical reason.
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Practical reason.
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Praktische Vernunft
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Handelingstheorie.
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| Subject
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Intentionaliteit.
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| Subject
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Rationaliteit.
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| Dewey Classification
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128/.4
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| LC Classification
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B105.I56S39 2003
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| NLM classification
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08.36bcl
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111.6
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