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" Having it both ways : "
edited by Guy Fletcher and Michael Ridge.
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BL
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| Record Number
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103198
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| Doc. No
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b60658
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| Title & Author
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Having it both ways : : hybrid theories and modern metaethics /\ edited by Guy Fletcher and Michael Ridge.
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| Series Statement
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Oxford moral theory
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| Page. NO
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xvi, 302 pages ;; 25 cm.
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| ISBN
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9780199347582 (hardback)
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: 0199347581 (hardback)
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| Bibliographies/Indexes
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Includes bibliographical references and index.
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| Contents
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Machine generated contents note: -- Contributors -- Introduction -- Part I -- 1. How to Insult a Philosopher -- Michael Ridge -- 2. Expressivism, Non-Declaratives, and Success-Conditional Semantics -- Daniel Boisvert -- 3. Can a Hybrid Theory Have it Both Ways? Moral Thought, Open Questions and Moral Motivation -- David Copp -- 4. Attitudinal Requirements for Moral Thought and Language: Noncognitive Type-Generality -- Ryan Hay -- 5. Diachronic Hybrid Moral Realism -- Jon Tresan -- 6. The Pragmatics of Normative Disagreement -- Stephen Finlay -- 7. Hybrid Expressivism: How to Think About Meaning. -- John Eriksson -- Part II -- 8. Moral Utterances, Attitude Expression and Implicature -- Guy Fletcher -- 9. Pure versus Hybrid Expressivism and the Enigma of Conventional Implicature -- Stephen Barker -- 10. (How) is Ethical Neo- Expressivism a Hybrid View? -- Dorit Bar-On, Matthew Chrisman and Jim Sias -- 11. Why Go Hybrid? A Cognitivist Alternative to Hybrid Theories of Normative Judgment -- Laura Schroeter and Francois Schroeter -- 12. Truth In Hybrid Semantics -- Mark Schroeder -- Bibliography -- Index.
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| Abstract
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"The two main competing traditions in mainstream metaethics are cognitivism and non-cognitivism. The traditional view of this divide is that the cognitivist understands moral (and other normative) judgments as representational states (e.g. beliefs) whereas the non-cognitivist understands them instead as non-representational states - typically as desire-like states of some kind (e.g. emotions, plans, preferences). Because moral and other normative judgments genuinely do seem to have both belief-like and desire-like elements, this debate has seen each side going through seemingly endless epicycles to either accommodate or debunk what the other side explains easily. Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in theories which transcend these categories by holding that moral and other normative judgments are themselves constituted by both belief-like and desire-like elements and/or that moral and other normative judgments 'express' both belief-like and desire-like states. These are called hybrid theories. The papers in this volume, all new, both provide a guide to the state of the art in this debate and push it forward along numerous fronts"--
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| Subject
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Metaethics.
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PHILOSOPHY / Ethics Moral Philosophy.
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| Dewey Classification
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170/.42
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| LC Classification
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BJ1012.H349 2014
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| NLM classification
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PHI005000bisacsh
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| Added Entry
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Fletcher, Guy,1983-
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Ridge, Michael, (Michael R.)
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