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" Detecting Sybil Attacks Using Proofs of Work and Location for Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs) "
Bewermeier, Niclas
Mahmoud, Mohamed
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Latin Dissertation
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| Language of Document
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English
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| Record Number
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1051336
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| Doc. No
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TL50453
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| Main Entry
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Bewermeier, Niclas
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| Title & Author
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Detecting Sybil Attacks Using Proofs of Work and Location for Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs)\ Bewermeier, NiclasMahmoud, Mohamed
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| College
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Tennessee Technological University
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| Date
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2019
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| Degree
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M.S.
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| student score
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2019
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| Note
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98 p.
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| Abstract
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Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs) enable vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications that will pave the way to the next-generation Intelligent Transportation System (ITS). ITS aims to improve the road safety and reduce slow traffic and jams. To preserve driver’s privacy, vehicles should use multiple pseudonyms instead of only one identity. However, malicious vehicles may exploit this abundance of pseudonyms and launch Sybil attacks by pretending to be multiple vehicles. Then, these Sybil (or fake) vehicles report false data, e.g., to create fake congestions or pollute the traffic management data. In this thesis, we propose a novel Sybil attack detection scheme using proofs of work and location. The idea is that each road side unit (RSU) is responsible for issuing a signed and time-stamped tag as a proof for the vehicle’s anonymous location. Each vehicle should use the proofs sent from multiple RSUs to create an anonymous trajectory. The vehicle should send its trajectory to a traffic management center (TMC) which should use a matching technique to identify the trajectories sent from Sybil vehicles. The scheme depends on the fact that since the Sybil vehicles are bounded physically to one vehicle, their trajectories should overlap. We design the proof of location so that one RSU is not able to create trajectories for the vehicles, but the contributions of several RSUs are needed. By this way, our scheme can be secured against RSU compromise attacks. In addition, to limit the ability of attackers to create multiple trajectories for the Sybil vehicles, upon receiving the proof of location from an RSU, the vehicle also receives a computational puzzle to solve. The vehicles should solve the puzzle and provide the solution (proof of work) to the next RSU to obtain a proof of location. Our extensive simulations and experiments demonstrate that our scheme achieves high detection rate to Sybil attacks with low false negative and acceptable communication and computation overhead.
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| Descriptor
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Computer Engineering
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Computer science
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Electrical engineering
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| Added Entry
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Mahmoud, Mohamed
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Tennessee Technological University
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