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" Anatomy of Dissent: Senior U.S. Military Leader Resistance to the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era "
Burke, Thomas E.
Shultz, Richard H., Jr.
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Latin Dissertation
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English
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| Record Number
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1058801
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TL57918
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Burke, Thomas E.
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| Title & Author
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Anatomy of Dissent: Senior U.S. Military Leader Resistance to the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era\ Burke, Thomas E.Shultz, Richard H., Jr.
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| College
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Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University)
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| Date
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2020
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| Degree
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Ph.D.
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2020
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| Note
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341 p.
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| Abstract
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Throughout the history of the United States, presidents have used the threat or actual use of military force as an instrument of foreign policy, often but not always in furtherance of vital national security interests. In the post-Cold War era, the United States used military force abroad for a range of non-vital purposes: to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing; to neutralize specific threats within a target state; and to provide humanitarian assistance by deterring attacks against vulnerable populations. These interventionist uses of military force have not gone unchallenged, especially by senior military leaders who view the military’s central purpose as fighting and winning the nation’s wars. The central question of this research asks: in the post-Cold War era, why are senior U.S. military leaders likely to resist presidential foreign policy decisions involving the use of force? While there exists a considerable body of theoretical and empirical literature on the U.S. military’s preferences for when and how force should be used, it often focuses on what the military prefers without explicitly addressing why or from whence these preferences take shape in the first place. This dissertation has two principal objectives: first, and by following a multiple-case study methodology, it seeks to confirm or deny the findings from extensive survey data regarding senior U.S. military leader preferences for when and how military force should be used in U.S. foreign policy; second, it seeks to determine if generalizations may be made as to those conditions under which senior U.S. military leaders will likely resist the use of military force. This dissertation will accomplish these objectives by examining the use of force in three cases—Somalia (1992); Bosnia (1992-1995); and Iraq (2003)—to understand the role of structure and organizational culture on military behavior and, consequently, how those influences shape military preferences regarding when and under what conditions force should be used. My analytical strategy uses theoretical propositions while exploring rival explanations, and my analytical techniques include pattern matching and explanation building to understand the complexities inherent in the phenomenon of resistance. I then use cross-case synthesis to ensure a replication logic follows from case to case. For this dissertation, the variable of interest is senior U.S. military leader resistance, which is defined as that provision of “considered military advice” that recommends against the use of force. My research plan included consulting existing case studies, peer-reviewed histories, selected memories, biographies, declassified National Security Council minutes, op-eds, and foreign policy publications. When able, I conducted structured interviews with relevant senior military leaders involved in the decision-making process. My intent is to contribute to the existing literature in two important ways. First, and perhaps most importantly, this dissertation attempts to determine whether causal linkages exist between my proposed hypotheses—to include rival theories—and the phenomenon of senior U.S. military leaders resisting presidential foreign policy decisions involving use of force in the post-Cold War era. Second, and through my study of additional theoretical literatures on the role of structure and organizational culture in shaping values and interests, this piece intends to explain why senior military leaders believe as they do and, therefore, behave predictably and consistently across cases and over time in a post-Cold War context.
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American studies
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International relations
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Military studies
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Shultz, Richard H., Jr.
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Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University)
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