| Abstract
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Old Catholic theologians have often underlined the relationship between papal supremacy and infallibility and the priority of the former: the pope has full, supreme, and universal power over the whole Church, therefore he must be obeyed; but at the same time, he may be obeyed, because he will not mislead the Church due to his infallibility. This article analyses this relationship, applying differentiations on two axes: on the one hand, Bocheński’s typology of epistemic and deontic authority; on the other hand, the notions of personal, formal and constitutional authority. The fact that the infallibility dogma of Vatican i considers papal authority at the same time as epistemic and constitutional authority, is identified as a major weakness of the dogma. The article will then approach the question how church leaders should practise their deontic authority in a context where their (and everybody else’s) epistemic authority is considered to be fallible. Old Catholic theologians have often underlined the relationship between papal supremacy and infallibility and the priority of the former: the pope has full, supreme, and universal power over the whole Church, therefore he must be obeyed; but at the same time, he may be obeyed, because he will not mislead the Church due to his infallibility. This article analyses this relationship, applying differentiations on two axes: on the one hand, Bocheński’s typology of epistemic and deontic authority; on the other hand, the notions of personal, formal and constitutional authority. The fact that the infallibility dogma of Vatican i considers papal authority at the same time as epistemic and constitutional authority, is identified as a major weakness of the dogma. The article will then approach the question how church leaders should practise their deontic authority in a context where their (and everybody else’s) epistemic authority is considered to be fallible.
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