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" Political Theology between Reason and Will "
Richard Amesbury
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AL
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| Record Number
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1072495
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LA116124
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| Call No
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10.1163/22124810-00601003
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| Language of Document
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English
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| Main Entry
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Richard Amesbury
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| Title & Author
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Political Theology between Reason and Will [Article]\ Richard Amesbury
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| Publication Statement
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Leiden: Brill | Nijhoff
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| Title of Periodical
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Journal of Law, Religion and State
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| Date
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2018
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| Volume/ Issue Number
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6/1
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| Page No
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49–67
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| Abstract
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Contemporary practitioners of political theology make use of Carl Schmitt’s account of sovereignty to criticize liberal political theory. But whereas Schmitt focused on “states of exception,” the new decisionism holds that decision-making is a quotidian feature of jurisprudence: the interpretation of law depends upon judicial decisions that serve to impose meaning on otherwise semantically indeterminate norms. Ironically, it is possible to detect in the contemporary decisionist critique of liberal theory, with its focus on law’s meaning, a liberalizing tendency: by insisting on the ubiquity of decision-making, the exception is made to seem unexceptional. In this way, Schmitt is tamed, and sovereignty is diffused into the mundane world of administrative governance. I want to resist this normalizing account on philosophical grounds: if one is to appreciate the exceptional character of the decision, it is important to retain some background of regularity with which it can be contrasted. Contemporary practitioners of political theology make use of Carl Schmitt’s account of sovereignty to criticize liberal political theory. But whereas Schmitt focused on “states of exception,” the new decisionism holds that decision-making is a quotidian feature of jurisprudence: the interpretation of law depends upon judicial decisions that serve to impose meaning on otherwise semantically indeterminate norms. Ironically, it is possible to detect in the contemporary decisionist critique of liberal theory, with its focus on law’s meaning, a liberalizing tendency: by insisting on the ubiquity of decision-making, the exception is made to seem unexceptional. In this way, Schmitt is tamed, and sovereignty is diffused into the mundane world of administrative governance. I want to resist this normalizing account on philosophical grounds: if one is to appreciate the exceptional character of the decision, it is important to retain some background of regularity with which it can be contrasted.
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Carl Schmitt
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decisionism
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Ludwig Wittgenstein
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Paul W. Kahn
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philosophy of law
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political theology
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the self
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voluntarism
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| Location & Call number
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10.1163/22124810-00601003
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