| Abstract
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Johannes Climacus, pseudonymous author of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments, presents to his reader the “absolute paradox.” Though initially presented in terms of Socratic and Un-Socratic theories of knowledge, this paper argues that Climacus’ paradox is concerned with the tension between soteriological claims about human agency and divine sovereignty. Does man choose God? Or does God choose man? Though Climacus draws stark contrasts between the Socratic and the Un-Socratic, he goes to great lengths to retain them both. Through Climacus’ synthesis, Kierkegaard demonstrates his acceptance of free will and determinism as an uneasy unity—a kind of unstable equilibrium. This view of Fragments results in an emphasis on human agency that is affirmed in the broader Kierkegaardian corpus: Rather than being paralyzed by one’s inability to fathom the absolute paradox, Kierkegaard insists that one move forward in spite of the paradox, take the leap, and do Christianity. Johannes Climacus, pseudonymous author of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments, presents to his reader the “absolute paradox.” Though initially presented in terms of Socratic and Un-Socratic theories of knowledge, this paper argues that Climacus’ paradox is concerned with the tension between soteriological claims about human agency and divine sovereignty. Does man choose God? Or does God choose man? Though Climacus draws stark contrasts between the Socratic and the Un-Socratic, he goes to great lengths to retain them both. Through Climacus’ synthesis, Kierkegaard demonstrates his acceptance of free will and determinism as an uneasy unity—a kind of unstable equilibrium. This view of Fragments results in an emphasis on human agency that is affirmed in the broader Kierkegaardian corpus: Rather than being paralyzed by one’s inability to fathom the absolute paradox, Kierkegaard insists that one move forward in spite of the paradox, take the leap, and do Christianity.
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