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" Superstitious Subjects: "
Charles McCrary
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AL
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| Record Number
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1077928
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| Doc. No
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LA121557
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| Call No
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10.1163/15700682-12341408
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| Language of Document
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English
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| Main Entry
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Charles McCrary
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| Title & Author
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Superstitious Subjects: [Article] : us Religion, Race, and Freedom\ Charles McCrary
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| Publication Statement
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Leiden: Brill
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| Title of Periodical
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Method Theory in the Study of Religion
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| Date
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2018
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| Volume/ Issue Number
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30/1
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| Page No
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56–70
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| Abstract
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This article employs the trinary framework to interrogate American religious freedom and religious actors’ interaction with the us state. It focuses on issues of governance and the classification and management of state subjects and their activities, showing how these lived effects are entwined with more “academic” or intellectual concerns about the categories religion and superstition. The article uses “superstition” in two ways. First, it is a term many Americans, from jurists to popular writers to academics, have used to describe human activities, often with racial assumptions and implications built into the framework. Second, scholars today might use the term, as part of the trinary, as an analytical device. The argument is that because the United States guarantees religious freedom, the state (or, more specifically, a particular state agent) must classify beliefs and practices as religious. This leaves a third category of activities that are clearly not secular but are also not religious, because they are not protected. Thus, we might call this third category “superstition” or “the superstitious.” The article tests this framework with two brief case studies drawn from the early and late twentieth century, respectively. This article employs the trinary framework to interrogate American religious freedom and religious actors’ interaction with the us state. It focuses on issues of governance and the classification and management of state subjects and their activities, showing how these lived effects are entwined with more “academic” or intellectual concerns about the categories religion and superstition. The article uses “superstition” in two ways. First, it is a term many Americans, from jurists to popular writers to academics, have used to describe human activities, often with racial assumptions and implications built into the framework. Second, scholars today might use the term, as part of the trinary, as an analytical device. The argument is that because the United States guarantees religious freedom, the state (or, more specifically, a particular state agent) must classify beliefs and practices as religious. This leaves a third category of activities that are clearly not secular but are also not religious, because they are not protected. Thus, we might call this third category “superstition” or “the superstitious.” The article tests this framework with two brief case studies drawn from the early and late twentieth century, respectively.
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| Descriptor
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American religion
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race
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religious freedom
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secularism
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superstition
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| Location & Call number
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10.1163/15700682-12341408
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