| Abstract
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In upholding France’s ban on public face coverings, the European Court of Human Rights accepted that the manifestation of religious beliefs could legitimately be restricted in the interests of ‘vivre ensemble’—literally, ‘living together’—or what I label ‘fraternalism’. I will argue that fraternalism, in the French setting, is closely linked to the idea of a duty of civility in political theory: it is understood as a duty to practice a certain kind of fraternal sociability. This paper relates the Court’s judgment to France’s justificatory, ‘republican’ discourse. It argues that civility must be understood as a habitus—a set of learned orientations and bodily techniques—rather than as a set of discursive or speech constraints. In turn, this demonstrates the danger in the idea of civility (or fraternalism) as limiting religious liberties: far from simply fostering republican virtues, it will reinforce cultural and social power dynamics. In upholding France’s ban on public face coverings, the European Court of Human Rights accepted that the manifestation of religious beliefs could legitimately be restricted in the interests of ‘vivre ensemble’—literally, ‘living together’—or what I label ‘fraternalism’. I will argue that fraternalism, in the French setting, is closely linked to the idea of a duty of civility in political theory: it is understood as a duty to practice a certain kind of fraternal sociability. This paper relates the Court’s judgment to France’s justificatory, ‘republican’ discourse. It argues that civility must be understood as a habitus—a set of learned orientations and bodily techniques—rather than as a set of discursive or speech constraints. In turn, this demonstrates the danger in the idea of civility (or fraternalism) as limiting religious liberties: far from simply fostering republican virtues, it will reinforce cultural and social power dynamics.
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