| Abstract
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This article argues that institutional corruption is the central governance dilemma in Africa by examining the causes, outcome, and origins of the 1996–97 Tanzania coffee crisis. It shows how the growth and crash of a coffee price bubble became a harbinger for defining corruption as historically embedded institutional tendencies and advantages, instead of acts of individual malfeasance. Institutional corruption highlights political gains from the use of public resources in the form of political influence over producer prices, concentrated market power, and centralized policymaking for the wealthy and politically connected, as opposed to personal gains. This article argues that institutional corruption is the central governance dilemma in Africa by examining the causes, outcome, and origins of the 1996–97 Tanzania coffee crisis. It shows how the growth and crash of a coffee price bubble became a harbinger for defining corruption as historically embedded institutional tendencies and advantages, instead of acts of individual malfeasance. Institutional corruption highlights political gains from the use of public resources in the form of political influence over producer prices, concentrated market power, and centralized policymaking for the wealthy and politically connected, as opposed to personal gains.
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