How Do We See That Something Is Living? Synthetic Creatures and Phenomenology of Perception

مرکز و کتابخانه مطالعات اسلامی به زبان های اروپایی

منو

" How Do We See That Something Is Living? Synthetic Creatures and Phenomenology of Perception "
Christoph Rehmann-Sutter

Document Type	:	AL
Record Number	:	1085949
Doc. No	:	LA129578
Call No	:	‭10.1163/15685357-01701002‬
Language of Document	:	English
Main Entry	:	Christoph Rehmann-Sutter
Title & Author	:	How Do We See That Something Is Living? Synthetic Creatures and Phenomenology of Perception [Article]\ Christoph Rehmann-Sutter
Publication Statement	:	Leiden: Brill
Title of Periodical	:	Worldviews: Global Religions, Culture, and Ecology
Date	:	2013
Volume/ Issue Number	:	17/1
Page No	:	10–25
Abstract	:	The creation of synthetic life forms raises the question of what we mean when we say that a synthetic cell is “alive.” This paper analyzes the problem of aliveness both as an epistemological question (how can we know?) and as a phenomenological question (how can we perceive?). It introduces basic concepts that can be used in a phenomenological analysis of the “givenness” of life and argues that aliveness can only be seen with reference to the experiences of the observer as him/herself living. Life is therefore inherently ambiguous. When perceiving other life forms, we are aware of our own life. In order to develop a concept of the “other life” of a synthetic bacterium, we need to be aware of projecting perceptual evidence of our own life onto that of other species. The concept of “other life” can address a very basic layer: seeing another life form’s being-in-the-world as (1) a center of its own spontaneity, (2) a particular way of being in time that can be described as duration, and (3) as a system of processes that contain their own sense as practices. The creation of synthetic life forms raises the question of what we mean when we say that a synthetic cell is “alive.” This paper analyzes the problem of aliveness both as an epistemological question (how can we know?) and as a phenomenological question (how can we perceive?). It introduces basic concepts that can be used in a phenomenological analysis of the “givenness” of life and argues that aliveness can only be seen with reference to the experiences of the observer as him/herself living. Life is therefore inherently ambiguous. When perceiving other life forms, we are aware of our own life. In order to develop a concept of the “other life” of a synthetic bacterium, we need to be aware of projecting perceptual evidence of our own life onto that of other species. The concept of “other life” can address a very basic layer: seeing another life form’s being-in-the-world as (1) a center of its own spontaneity, (2) a particular way of being in time that can be described as duration, and (3) as a system of processes that contain their own sense as practices.
Descriptor	:	definitions of life
Descriptor	:	Husserl
Descriptor	:	perception of livingness
Descriptor	:	phenomenology in biology
Descriptor	:	philosophy of biology
Descriptor	:	synthetic biology
Location & Call number	:	‭10.1163/15685357-01701002‬