Britain's interdependence policy and Anglo-American cooperation on nuclear and conventional force pr...

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" Britain's interdependence policy and Anglo-American cooperation on nuclear and conventional force provision, 1957-1964. "
Middeke, Michael.

Document Type	:	Latin Dissertation
Record Number	:	1093143
Doc. No	:	TLets267743
Main Entry	:	Middeke, Michael.
Title & Author	:	Britain's interdependence policy and Anglo-American cooperation on nuclear and conventional force provision, 1957-1964.\ Middeke, Michael.
College	:	London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London)
Date	:	1999
student score	:	1999
Degree	:	Ph.D.
Abstract	:	Chapter One describes Britain's nuclear and conventional defence policy towards the United Statesduring 1957-1959. Britain's nuclear policy during these years was based on reconciling Britishindependence with Anglo-American cooperation and cost effectiveness. The British governmentreduced Britain's conventional forces, but Britain's force strength In Europe had to be adjusted asthe Americans began to support calls for a build-up of conventional forces in Europe. Chapter Twodeals with Macmillan's policies on SKYBOLT, POLARIS and the NATO MRBM force during 1960.The British government was keen on getting both missiles from the Americans, aiming at a deal thatwould leave Britain with a maximum degree of independence for her deterrent. The EisenhowerAdministration's support for SACEUR's NATO MRBM force proposals thwarted British attempts toget POLARIS. Chapter Three describes Macmillan's attempt at reconciling Britain's nuclearcooperation with the United States with British offers of military cooperation with France during1961-1962. Such options were considered in order to prevent Britain's deterrent from beingsubsumed within a multilateral force. An Anglo-French nuclear alignment was one possiblealternative to a more obvious example of alliance interdependence, a NATO nuclear force backedby the United States. In Chapter Four Britain's efforts to reduce her conventional forces during theyears 1960-1962 are discussed. These efforts coincide with American pressure to build upconventional forces in Europe in the wake of the Berlin crisis. Anglo-American discussions over theconventional force strength issue culminated in the Nassau meeting of December 1962. The generalBritish debate on future commitments and deployments overshadowed the coordination of effortswith the Americans on conventional forces overseas. Chapter Five describes Britain's nuclearrelationship with the United States in the aftermath of Nassau. This centred on the drafting of aPOLARIS Sales agreement and finding some common ground on the NATO multilateral force issue.On the former, the British position was challenged by American efforts at renegotiating the Nassauagreement. On the latter, the British government was divided over if and to what extent it shouldcooperate with the Americans on the MLF. The US Administrations under Kennedy and Johnsonwere only half-hearted in their support for the mixed manned multilateral force. Macmillanmeanwhile remained hesitant about suggestions to embark upon a nuclear rapprochement withFrance. Chapter Six follows Britain's attempt to reach a decision on commitments and conventionalforce deployments during the years 1963-1 964. Members of the British government were inclinedto look at the division of defence tasks between Brita n and the United States in areas outside NATOas another form of Anglo-American interdependence at work. During Douglas-Home's premiership,Britain's role in out-of-NATO areas assumed greater significance.
Subject	:	Defence policy; Anglo-American relations
Added Entry	:	London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London)