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" Michael Polanyi's theory of tacit knowledge : "
Mwamba, Tchafu.
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Latin Dissertation
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| Record Number
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1093765
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TLets299699
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| Main Entry
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Mwamba, Tchafu.
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| Title & Author
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Michael Polanyi's theory of tacit knowledge :\ Mwamba, Tchafu.
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| College
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London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London)
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| Date
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1998
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| student score
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1998
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| Degree
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Ph.D.
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| Abstract
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The progress of science depends partly, upon the acceptance of indeterminate tacitpremisses about the nature of science and the object of science. These premisses are tacitbecause(i) they extend to what is beyond the limitations of present data, -not the empirical or theimaginative- and therefore involve heuristic anticipations.(ii) they also involve personal and interpersonal mechanisms such as the personalpresuppositions and commitments of the scientist operating within a given community.This community confers values on scientific work in the form of publications, researchgrants, professional positions, etc.. This transcends the objective subjective dichotomy sincethe scientist submits to requirements acknowledged by himself with universal intent, that isthe scientist's responsibility to pursue his research and confer his judgements as his vision ofreality would have him hold as universally necessary.(iii)their acceptance is largely a-critical - they are functional interpretative systems rather thanstatic objects. Although when they are the object of study, they are facts, they are not thefact since they play a vectorial role in establishing facts. They make factuaiity possible.There is a strong case for tacit knowledge. Therefore, Polanyi submits, we should question aconcept of scientific objectivity which rests solely upon logical and empirical foundations.Even though numerous mathematics and technical procedures can be employed, theobjective value of a scientific theory cannot be wholly formally assessed.Polanyi's theory, in differentiating rationality from formal inference, shows the way towardsa non-normative but non-subjectivist epistemology of science beyond theaccounts of the practice of science of Kuhn, Lakatos and Laudan.
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Scientific objectivity
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| Added Entry
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London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London)
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