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" Greece and Yugoslavia in Hitler's strategy, 1940-1941 "
Van Creveld, Martin
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Latin Dissertation
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| Record Number
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1095247
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TLets388829
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| Main Entry
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Van Creveld, Martin
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| Title & Author
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Greece and Yugoslavia in Hitler's strategy, 1940-1941\ Van Creveld, Martin
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| College
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London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
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| Date
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1971
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| student score
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1971
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| Degree
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Ph.D.
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| Abstract
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At noon on 31 May 1941 Hitler, after a two hour speech summing up his most recent conquests in the Balkans, received the ovation of his Reichstag. The two national anthems were sung and the assembly dispersed. With that, the seal was put on what proved to be Germany's last successful Blitzkrieg. In the present study the relationship between this campaign and Hitler's overall strategy is traced step by step. Originally, it turns out, Hitler did not want a war in either Greece or Yugoslavia, since both served him as sources of raw materials and because of the danger of a general Balkan conflagration ensuing. This was the view he repeatedly put to his more bellicose ally - more strongly so over Yugoslavia, less explicitly where Greece was concerned. With Hitler's decision of September 1940 to transfer the war against England into the Mediterranean this attitude changed. He now came to regard Greece as a place worth possessing, and accordingly gave Mussolini the go ahead on 4 October 1940. When the Italians proved unable to handle the task, Hitler decided to move in himself. Scarcely had this decision been made, however, when a crucial change took-place in Hitler's overall strategy; he made up to attack the Soviet Union in 1941. Together with the entire Mediterranean, Greece now became a secondary affair end a nuisance, of which Hitler tried - unsuccessfully - to get rid by diplomatic means. Having failed in this he saw no choice but to go ahead with his planned invasion which, however, now acquired a new, defensive purpose. German preparations for operation "Marita" are next described in some detail. Both man and nature, it turns out, did their best to put obstacles in the way. Consequently the campaign started two months late. All attempts to speed up the beginning of the operation - so as to make it end in time for the Russian campaign - ended in failure. In the last chapter the effects of Hitler's Balkan campaign on his war against Russia are dealt with. Contrary to what is usually believed, the decision to invade Yugoslavia is shown not to have had appreciable detrimental effects in this connection. Rather, the late starting date of operation "Barbarossa" is traced to the shortage of equipment from which the Wehrmacht was suffering. The Balkan campaign was Hitler's last, and in a sense greatest, strategical success. On 31 May 1941 Hitler had reached the peak of his power in Europe. Although many victorious battles still lay ahead, the curve of fate was now pointing downward.
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D731 World War II
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DR Balkan Peninsula
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| Added Entry
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London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
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