|
" The rejection of silence and desolation : "
Melunsky, Jonathan.
| Document Type
|
:
|
Latin Dissertation
|
| Record Number
|
:
|
1095348
|
| Doc. No
|
:
|
TLets392684
|
| Main Entry
|
:
|
Melunsky, Jonathan.
|
| Title & Author
|
:
|
The rejection of silence and desolation :\ Melunsky, Jonathan.
|
| College
|
:
|
School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London)
|
| Date
|
:
|
2000
|
| student score
|
:
|
2000
|
| Degree
|
:
|
Ph.D.
|
| Abstract
|
:
|
Liberalisation in South Africa on 2 February 1990 appeared to constitute a remarkablevolte-face, and raises many questions. Why did it happen? Did it result from a singlefactor, or a complex mixture of elements? How did long-term trends and underlyingforces shape February 1990, and interact with more immediate events? Howimportant was political leadership, as opposed to underlying structural pressures?How inevitable was 2 February 1990?In the dissertation it is argued that there was no solitary cause of February1990: many factors contributed, although some were undoubtedly more consequentialthan others. Socio-economic development combined with cultural heritages (Western,constitutional, legal, civil society, religious) to shape the direction of change, curtailcertain state options, and gradually strangle apartheid. Government neither wanted,nor was able, to prevent economic growth and social integration, the prevention ofwhich was imperative for apartheid to succeed. Underlying socio-economic andcultural structures had a gradual, almost irresistible, although not inevitable, quality.Of themselves, these forces do not explain the how, when and where of the transition.Rather they indicated that some time in the future, a transition would occur. Pressurefrom below rejected all government attempts at reform, and indicated all futureattempts would be insufficient unless they aimed to resolve - in a fair manner - thecentral issue of black participation in central government. Afrikaner elites, engagedover decades in a vigorous debate, concluded drastic change was necessary. Locked ina stalemate, and sensing a catastrophic alternative, key individuals on both sides setout to talk to the opposition, building bridges and exploring common-ground. Thisprocess, while often having no fixed destination, developed a momentum that wasdifficult to curtail. It was the chance occurrence of two factors in 1989 - PW Botha'sstroke and the collapse of communism - that opened opportunities for genuinechange. Liberalisation eventually occurred because FW de Klerk and a handful ofAfrikaner elites calculated that the ghastly alternative - continued conflict and adeteriorating economy - would do more harm to Afrikaners, whites and the country,probably in that order. Helped by a political culture that allowed Afrikaner leadersconsiderable leeway in decision-making, they went beyond the views of their support-base,confident they could swing them round to their point of view.
|
| Added Entry
|
:
|
School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London)
|
| |