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" War planning and strategic development in the Royal Navy, 1887-1918 "
Grimes, Shawn
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Latin Dissertation
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| Record Number
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1095717
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TLets408275
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| Main Entry
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Grimes, Shawn
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| Title & Author
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War planning and strategic development in the Royal Navy, 1887-1918\ Grimes, Shawn
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| College
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University of London
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| Date
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2004
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2004
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| Degree
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Ph.D.
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| Abstract
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This dissertation examines the Royal Navy's war planning and strategicevolution from the late Victorian era into the First World War. It demonstrates that adefinitive planning trend existed throughout the period which was consistentlylegitimised by several factors: the study of naval history. manoeuvres, European powerpolitics, procurement, and individual talent. The technological/strategic challengesposed by a perceived Franco-Russian naval threat during the late nineteenth century ledto the evolution of a strategy entailing the observational blockade of an enemy's portsand offensive operations between 1888-1905. Based in the Naval Intell igenceDepartment (NID), planning was influenced by the historical revitalisation of Britain'snaval past and its application to contemporary technical/strategic dilemmas. As de factoplanning staff until 1909, the NID modified this dual observational/offensive strategyfor war against Wilhelmine Germany. Under Admiral Sir John Fisher, planning aimedat Germany's naval and commercial assets in the Baltic intensified and was utilised asa deterrent to counter aggressive German foreign policy after 1904. Conversely, theScandinavian neutrality dilemma, 1905-1908, exerted a strong influence on theAdmiralty'S strategic policy. Responding to the potential closure of the Baltic entrances,Fisher initiated the Admiralty's first "official" war plans in 1907-08. The primarycontingencies involved a distant/observational blockade or an offensive Baltic descentwhich ensured the Navy could still pursue a direct campaign against Germany'seconomic and naval assets. Despite internal dissension, external probes into Admiraltypolicy, and increased centralisation in strategic matters after 1908. this dual strategyremained in place into the First World War. During the war, operational realitiesassociated with the North Sea stalemate and German submarine depredations, ironically,rejuvenated offensive designs from the 1904-1908 period alongside the stable economicpressure exerted by the distant blockade until 1918.
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University of London
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