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" British Government strategy in Northern Ireland, 1969-98 : "
Neumann, Peter
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Latin Dissertation
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| Record Number
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1097349
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TLets509368
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| Main Entry
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Neumann, Peter
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| Title & Author
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British Government strategy in Northern Ireland, 1969-98 :\ Neumann, Peter
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| College
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University of London
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| Date
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2002
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| student score
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2002
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| Degree
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Ph.D.
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| Abstract
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Using the methods of strategic analysis, this work evaluates the Britishgovernment's approach towards the conflict in Northern Ireland, starting withLondon's first intervention in 1969, and ending with the signing of the BelfastAgreement in 1998. The British government's aim throughout the period wasto achieve the containment of the conflict. In the years 1969-71, it wasbelieved that this aim could be realised by maintaining the existingconstitutional structures of Home Rule and Unionist majority rule. Theoutcomes of this strategy, however, were wholly negative. From 1972, thegovernment's aim translated into the objective of creating political stabilitythrough a system of government to which both sides would consent, thusestablishing a mutual veto on what was seen as the 'political solution'. Itfollowed that the most important factor to determine London's strategy wasthe imperative of facilitating political agreement. However, traditional ideascontinued to interfere with the conditioning of the strategic instruments, sothat London's effectiveness as a political facilitator turned out to be limited.As a consequence, there were two attempts to circumvent the logic of themutual veto: the notion of producing stability by making Direct Rule fromLondon semi-permanent (1976-79), and the idea of easing the operation ofDirect Rule through an inter-governmental framework, resulting in the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. Although both attempts were failures in that theycould not achieve what the British government had intended, theynevertheless conditioned the form of agreement that was reached in 1998.The Belfast Agreement made it possible for the British government to realiseits objective, yet in allowing some parties to maintain the threat of violence asa means with which to obtain concessions, it suffers from an asymmetry thatfurthers instability and might well turn out to make the achievement ofcontainment impossible
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University of London
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