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" The origins and development of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence: "
Welch, Howard Graham
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Latin Dissertation
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| Record Number
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1099685
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TLets580309
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| Main Entry
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Welch, Howard Graham
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| Title & Author
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The origins and development of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence:\ Welch, Howard Graham
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| College
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King's College London (University of London)
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| Date
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1974
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1974
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| Degree
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Ph.D.
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| Abstract
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This thesis examines the origins and developmentof the Chiefs of Staff Sub-committee from its foundation in1923 as a result of recommendations by the Salisbury Committeeuntil the outbreak of World War II. Under the terms of theirWarrant, the Chiefs of Staff were charged collectively tokeep the defence situation under constant review and advisethe Cabinet on strategic and military policy,. As 'Super Chiefsof a War Staff in Commission', they would act as the centreof strategic planning for the Committee of Imperial Defence,.,Consulting 'together, they would co-ordinate plans and policyand evolve a common strategic doctrineThe Chiefs of Staff Sub-committee did not realizethese hopes or achieve the status of 'Super Chiefs of Staffin Commission'. The Ten Year Rule provided no politicalfoundation for strategic policy and provoked such intenserivalry among the Chiefs of Staff, with each strugglingto secure for his Service a larger share of the Treasury'sdiminished allowance, that long term strategic planningwas never begun. Through their Annual Reviews, the Chiefsof Staff were instrumental in bringing about the abolitionof the Ten Year Rule end the establishment of the DefenceRequirements Committee to p=spare a programme to meet theServices' worst deficiencies. But the recommendations of theChiefs of Staff were not based on any serious strategiCthought and feiled to make adequate provision for obviouscrintingencies. As B result, mini3ters imposed radicalchanges on the programmes of the Defence Requirements Committee.As ministerial confidence in the abilities of the Chiefs ofStaff end the quality of their professional advice declined,they exercised correspo~dingly less influence over defence:policy ond their strategic appreCiations, often prescient.were frequently· ignored,.,The Abyssinian crisis demonstrated that the Chiefsof Staff and Joint Planners did not set the standard of a.combined General Staff~ From 1935 onwards, the unresolvedcontroversy over the role of·air forces precluded a largemeasure of strategical and operational planning,.,Theappointment of a Mini~ter for Co-ordination of Defence didlittle: to improve the organization of defe~ce or bring the.Chiefs of·Staff closer together o~ matters of principle~ Thatin war the Chiefs of staff would assume the role of 'SuperCommanders in Commission' was expected; however, no ServiceChief of the period had the training or experience demandedof the Supreme Commander, nor were these. qualities developedwithin the Chiefs of Staff Sub-committee.
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King's College London (University of London)
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