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" Radical Leaders: "
Paquin-Pelletier, Alexandre
Bertrand, Jacques
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Latin Dissertation
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| Language of Document
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English
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| Record Number
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1104937
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| Doc. No
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TLpq2281306585
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| Main Entry
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Bertrand, Jacques
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Paquin-Pelletier, Alexandre
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| Title & Author
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Radical Leaders:\ Paquin-Pelletier, AlexandreBertrand, Jacques
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| College
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University of Toronto (Canada)
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| Date
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2019
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| student score
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2019
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| Degree
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Ph.D.
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| Page No
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269
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| Abstract
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Why do some Muslim leaders radicalize while others do not? Drawing on a study of radical mobilization in Indonesia, this dissertation argues that Muslim leaders radicalize when they find religious authority hard to gain and maintain. It makes two specific points: 1) radical mobilization is more likely among weak and precarious religious leaders, those with few followers and little institutionalization; and, 2) weak and precarious leaders are more likely to radicalize in crowded and competitive religious markets, because they need to be creative if they want to survive. It argues that weak Muslim leaders, in competitive environment, are the ones most likely to use strategies of outbidding, scapegoating, and provocation. The dissertation's empirical puzzle is the cross-regional variations in Islamist mobilization observed in post-transition Java, Indonesia. Since 1999, radical groups have proliferated and mobilized more in some regions than others. The study finds that in regions with radical groups and mobilization, most clerics have weak religious institutions, fragmented networks, and operate in competitive religious markets. In these markets, radical mobilization provides low-status clerics with a cheap and efficient way to bolster their religious authority. In regions where radical groups did not proliferate, most clerics have strong religious institutions with deep roots in society, extensive networks, and operate in much less competitive religious environments. In these markets, clerics do not feel the same urge to mobilize, as religious authority is more secure, stable, and routinized. The origins of these religious markets are traced back to sub-regional variations in the process of state building. State building strategies had long-lasting consequences on contemporary Muslim institutions by shaping subsequent political cleavages and state policies toward Islam. This dissertation is based on 13 months of fieldwork in Indonesia, 126 interviews with Muslim clerics and activists, and a new dataset of Java's 15,000 Islamic boarding schools and their 30,000 Muslim clerics.
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Comparative religion
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Political science
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Southeast Asian studies
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