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" Essays on the Moral Limits of Markets and Politics "
Pham, Adam K.
Hausman, Dan
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Latin Dissertation
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| Language of Document
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English
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| Record Number
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1106628
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| Doc. No
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TLpq2406985523
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| Main Entry
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Hausman, Dan
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Pham, Adam K.
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| Title & Author
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Essays on the Moral Limits of Markets and Politics\ Pham, Adam K.Hausman, Dan
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| College
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The University of Wisconsin - Madison
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| Date
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2020
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2020
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| Degree
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Ph.D.
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| Page No
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105
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| Abstract
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In this set of three essays, I examine several issues related to the moral limits of markets and politics. In the first two essays, I examine two traditional theoretical approaches to these problems, and I argue that neither sort of approach can, on its own, offer satisfying solutions. In the third essay, I offer a case study of the moral limits of markets: about the consumer scoring market. In Chapter 1 (“Injustice and the Economic Doctrine”), I examine moral problems from within what I call the “economic doctrine,'' a framework which lies broadly in the tradition of Milton Friedman, Murray Rothbard, and Robert Nozick. When used as a framework for evaluating simple cases about our duties and rights, the economic doctrine (§1.1) tracks our judgments and behaviors. Yet, when we add complexity to these simple cases, the doctrine fails. The doctrine cannot offer a plausible metaphysics of injustice (§1.2), it is predicated on economic knowledge that cannot be acquired (§1.3), it is embodied by arbitrary, inefficient, and unjust law (§1.4) and it cannot account for injustice that is essentially non-economic in nature (§1.5). I conclude (§1.6) that the economic doctrine is ill-equipped to cope with the complexity of injustice. In Chapter 2 (“Burden, Lawlessness, and the Political Doctrine”), I examine moral problems from the perspective of what I call the “political doctrine,” which lies broadly in the tradition of John Rawls and Philip Pettit. The political doctrine (§2.1) has two broad limitations. First, it embodies an inadequate conception of society (§2.2). Once we consider the complexities of our global burdens, it becomes clear that many of the most serious problems that face us confront us as an individuals, or as families, or as groups, or as nations, or as a planet, not as a postwar society of states. These forms of political decay have little to do with the balance of sovereignty among nation-states, and we must find other ways to address them. As a case study of these issues, I discuss the 2010 cholera epidemic in Haiti, which resulted from disaster relief efforts by UN subcontractors. Second, the political doctrine embodies an inadequate conception of the individual (§2.3). In the actual world, many of our deepest moral and social crises involve deep vulnerabilities of human agency. We should, on these grounds, abandon any kind of methodology that is premised on the idea that humans are rational and reasonable. As a case study of these issues, I discuss the ongoing civil war in South Sudan, which was catalyzed and perpetuated by forms of lawlessness that transcend our political boundaries. I conclude (§2.4) that the limits of the political doctrine should lead us to be pessimistic about the possibility of purely political solutions to our most pressing moral problems. In Chapter 3 (“The Moral Limits of the Market: A Case Study”), I offer an ethical assessment of a particular economic market and I argue that the assessment has ethical implications on how the market should be regulated. To conduct the assessment, I employ two heuristics for evaluating markets. One is the “harm” criterion, which relates to whether the market produces serious harms, either for participants in the market, for third parties, or for society considered as a whole. The other is the “agency” criterion, which relates to whether participants understand the nature and significance of the exchanges they are making, if they can be guaranteed fair representation, or if there is differential need for the market’s good. I argue that consumer scoring data should be subject to the same sort of regulation as the older FICO credit scores. Although the movement in the 1990s that was aimed at regulating the FICO scores was not aimed at restraining a market per se, I argue that the reforms were underwritten by concerns about the same sorts of problems as those outlined by our heuristics.
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Philosophy
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