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" What’s with the Attitude? Policymaker Attitudes Towards Intelligence and National Security "
Halman, Alexander Mark
Grauer, Ryan
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Latin Dissertation
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English
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| Record Number
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1107108
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| Doc. No
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TLpq2430694445
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| Main Entry
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Grauer, Ryan
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Halman, Alexander Mark
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| Title & Author
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What’s with the Attitude? Policymaker Attitudes Towards Intelligence and National Security\ Halman, Alexander MarkGrauer, Ryan
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| College
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University of Pittsburgh
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| Date
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2020
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| student score
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2020
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| Degree
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Ph.D.
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| Page No
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316
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| Abstract
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What determines why policymakers react to intelligence with elation or anger? There are countless examples of decision-makers blustering at their intelligence professionals, and there are equally as many instances of these same individuals later patting them on the back in triumph. This dissertation seeks to understand why. Specifically, it investigates what determines national security decision-makers’ attitudes towards intelligence. This research applies attitude theory to our understanding of intelligence utilization and represents a departure from previous intelligence research that employs cognitive psychology. The Cognitive-Affective Theory of Intelligence (CATI) contends that policymakers develop predictable attitudes towards intelligence. These attitudes are the result of three variables: 1) the type of intelligence, 2) the specificity of the intelligence, and 3) the level of decision-maker commitment to policy. Chapters One through Three contain an introduction to the puzzle, literature review, theoretical development, and methodological review. Chapter One provides context for the dissertation; here I demonstrate what attitude theory adds to Intelligence Studies. Chapter Two delves into the existing literature. Current research does not specifically examine the determinants of policymaker attitudes towards intelligence, and psychological and situational variables provides further analytical leverage. In Chapter Three, there is an explication of variable measurement, case selection, and methodology. Chapter Four examines President Lyndon B. Johnson’s unusually favorable attitude towards the intelligence preceding the Six-Day War. While uncommitted to his policy on Israel, he received confirmatory and specific intelligence that fit his preconceived notions about the situation that led to a favorable attitude. Not only does this case demonstrate the value-added of studying attitudes towards intelligence, but it also shows how demeanor can ultimately affect a policymaker’s relationship with his intelligence producer. Chapter Five focuses on the intelligence President Reagan received leading up to, and throughout the Lebanon debacle in the early 1980s. While data is limited due to classification and other intelligence usage issues, it is clear that the President displays a very unfavorable attitude towards the intelligence that is specific and disconfirming when he was highly committed to his peace plan. As the evidence in this case is more circumstantial, I conduct textual analysis and counterfactual analysis to bolster my claims. Chapter Six analyzes President Carter’s attitude towards the intelligence he received on the Korean Peninsula. Jimmy Carter ran on the importance of human rights and linked this policy to the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea as a result of Seoul’s poor record on the subject. While highly committed to this plan, the President received a significant amount of unspecific and disconfirming intelligence that stood in stark contrast to his stated political and moral objectives. These situations resulted in his very unfavorable attitude towards the intelligence he received. Chapter Seven explores Eisenhower’s attitude toward intelligence in five mini-cases. Each case addresses the remaining five of eight cells in the CATI’s two-by-two matrices to provide evidence for the robustness of the theory. While focusing primarily on the correlational nature of the CATI, this chapter provides more breadth and additional support for the generalizability of my theory. In the conclusion I provide a summary of the CATI and its implications for the theory and practice of intelligence. Overall, attitudes are a significant but understudied concept in both International Relations and intelligence research. This study demonstrates the value-added by examining the social-psychological dimensions of intelligence usage and opens a new stream of research and inquiry in Intelligence Studies.
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International relations
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Political science
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