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After suspending payment on their debts in 1875 and 1876, the Ottoman Empire and the largely autonomous province of Egypt were subjected to unprecedented forms of intervention in their domestic affairs. Spearheading the interference were two international financial commissions: The Ottoman Public Debt Administration and Egypt's Caisse de la Dette Publique. From afar, these two commissions appear very similar. Both were administered by Europeans, who collected revenues on behalf of the two governments; both introduced fiscal reforms that expanded and deepened the revenue base and helped restore the governments' credit; and both commissions sped the integration of the Ottoman Empire and Egypt into the world economy. But the commissions and the financial regimes they oversaw contrasted sharply in the manner of their creation, the authority they were granted, and the policies they pursued—with profound and lasting implications for Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, and the wider Middle East. According to any standard measure, Egypt and the Ottoman Empire were in comparably dire financial shape at the time of default. All else being equal, one would expect similar terms for settling their bankruptcies. But all else was not equal, and this dissertation explains how differences in financial institutions, government bureaucracies, and the strategic calculations of powerful European states combined to shape the bankruptcy negotiations and, with them, change the course of history. By adopting a comparative framework and drawing from a variety of primary and secondary sources in several languages, this dissertation assesses the larger political, economic, and diplomatic meaning of these two bankruptcies. It describes how the Great Powers diagnosed the bankruptcies and pursued their commercial, financial, and strategic interests in responding to them. It also assesses how Egyptian and Ottoman officials deployed a range of administrative, financial, and human resources in defending their financial and political autonomy. In so doing, this dissertation broadens our knowledge of the bankruptcies and their impact on the modern Middle East, while restoring the "periphery" to its proper place at the center of this story. It also serves as a cautionary tale for those who would, through finance, shape the fate of nations.
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