خط مشی دسترسیدرباره ماپشتیبانی آنلاین
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Document Type:Latin Dissertation
Language of Document:English
Record Number:53006
Doc. No:TL22960
Call number:‭3290322‬
Main Entry:Mohammad Reza Mirhosseini
Title & Author:Essays on public choiceMohammad Reza Mirhosseini
College:University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Date:2007
Degree:Ph.D.
student score:2007
Page No:65
Abstract:This dissertation is a collection of three papers in public choice. The first paper offers a dynamic model to explain the rationale behind "populist" policies. The effects of uncertainty about future policies, costly redistribution, and implicit tax limits are evaluated. I show that commitment to future redistribution enables the pro-poor policymaker to implement a welfare enhancing project with nonuniform benefits. However, possibility of regime change may discourage a pro-poor and encourage a pro-rich policymaker to implement that project. Moreover, policymakers might undertake a project not for its intrinsic value, but rather to influence future redistributive policy. For instance, a pro-rich policymaker might undertake a project that benefits the poor, if its implementation reduces the demand for redistribution by the poor in future. It is even possible that a project with negative present value creates a Pareto improvement. The second paper presents a model of primary election with strategic voters who are uncertain about the identity of population median in the general election. Primary voters face a trade off: a moderate candidate has a higher chance of winning in general election compared to a candidate closer to the party base who would provide the party a more preferred policy conditional on her victory. Comparative statics and numerical analysis suggest incumbent's shift to more radical policies, population median's shift toward the incumbent's party, more accurate information about the position of the population median, and incompetence of the incumbent are among the factors that may lead to election of a more centrist candidate. In the third paper we consider a society that has to decide on the wage that it offers for an elected official, who provides a public service for the citizens. Potential candidates differ in their competence and opportunity cost. They observe the wage, decide whether to enter as candidates, and if they do, how hard to campaign for winning the election. A higher wage makes more able candidates to enter, while both able and inept candidates campaign harder for the office. We analyze the optimal remuneration for the officials that maximizes ordinary citizens' expected utility.
Subject:Social sciences; Elected officials; Populist policies; Primary elections; Public choice; Wages; Economic theory; Public officials; Essays; Voter behavior; Wages & salaries; Populism; 0511:Economic theory; 0501:Economics
Added Entry:M. Polborn
Added Entry:University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign