Social action, rogue reaction: United States post-Cold War nuclear counterproliferation strategies

مرکز و کتابخانه مطالعات اسلامی به زبان های اروپایی

منو

" Social action, rogue reaction: United States post-Cold War nuclear counterproliferation strategies "
Alexander H. Montgomery S. D. Sagan

Document Type	:	Latin Dissertation
Language of Document	:	English
Record Number	:	53105
Doc. No	:	TL23059
Call number	:	‭3197483‬
Main Entry	:	Alexander H. Montgomery
Title & Author	:	Social action, rogue reaction: United States post-Cold War nuclear counterproliferation strategies\ Alexander H. Montgomery
College	:	Stanford University
Date	:	2006
Degree	:	Ph.D.
student score	:	2006
Page No	:	300
Abstract	:	Which US post-Cold War counterproliferation strategies towards nuclear aspirants have been most successful and why? Military capabilities, economic needs, and social desires provide both motivations for nuclear proliferation and opportunities for states to counter these motivations. I argue that strategies involving the use of military or economic tools alone are not only unsuccessful but are actually counterproductive. I demonstrate using the cases of North Korea and Iran that including social benefits in the form of symbolic and diplomatic gestures is crucial to the success of these strategies. To generate hypotheses regarding the effects of different types of strategies on nuclear outcomes, I combine realist, liberal, and constructivist theories with spiral and deterrent models. I include the effects of three intervening mechanisms: domestic political structures, positive feedback loops, and the effects of multiple-country interactions. To test these hypotheses, I break down strategies into individual actions directed at either suppressing the demand for or halting the supply of nuclear technologies to individual proliferants. I use vector autoregression to uncover action-reaction cycles and establish general interaction patterns between the United States and North Korea. I then use within-case congruence procedures to compare theoretical predictions of the effects of different types of strategies with nuclear outcomes in both North Korea and Iran. I find in both cases that feedback played an important role in amplifying US strategies and that social incentives were consistently related to success. Finally, I perform a cross-case comparison of how the structure of proliferation networks among second-tier nuclear aspirants has affected weapons development times; I find that tacit knowledge constrained the A. Q. Khan nuclear network to a hub-and-spoke structure, minimizing its effectiveness. Together, these findings imply that to stop proliferation, social benefits should be used to target existing and potential hubs of proliferation networks; future research should find that other proliferation networks are similarly constrained and that social motivations play a large role in proliferation decisions.
Subject	:	Social sciences; Iran; Korea; Nuclear counterproliferation; Post-Cold War; Social action; International law; International relations; 0616:International relations; 0616:International law
Added Entry	:	S. D. Sagan
Added Entry	:	Stanford University