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During the Cold War, France and Germany moved beyond their history as hereditary rivals to become cooperative partners, as might be expected when states are confronted by a global adversary. However, neither the extent of their cooperation nor the dramatic evolution in quality of their relations was expected. Indeed, so remarkable has been the move to what many call "warm peace" that the Franco-German relationship is often regarded as a "model" for the transformation of other post-rivalry relations. Neoliberal institutionalists argue that the lessons of the Franco-German case demonstrate the influence of institutional transparency. But Franco-German cooperation took place largely outside of institutions and sometimes against them. Moreover, other former rivals, such as Greece and Turkey or even Egypt and Israel, that were also subject to certain levels of institutional influence, failed to achieve the level of peace enjoyed by France and Germany. Constructivists suggest that shared European identity was instrumental in affecting warm Franco-German peace. However, the former rivals would often compete for leadership of "Europe" rather than collaborate for the good of the community idea. Furthermore, pro-European ideas in both Greece and Turkey often contributed to competition rather than cooperation. Similarly, the dominance of pro-Western ideas in both Egypt and Israel not only failed to subdue friction, but they were occasionally the cause of friction. These findings challenge conventional explanations of warm Franco-German peace. These findings also cast doubt on the merit of using this case (based on institutions or identity) as a model for transforming the quality of peace between other former rivals. In other words, these findings raise questions of whether warm peace based on institutions or identity is more apparent than real. In the postwar period, France and Germany developed security relations with the United States. The former rivals often found that their great power security partner had interests that were sometimes not only different than but also in competition with their own. A superpower security provider not completely committed to the interests of its partners could jeopardize their survival. France and Germany were thus led to cooperate in order to balance an uncertain security provider given a powerful global adversary. In order to meet the global challenge, the shared partner would at times build up one of the former rivals, often creating friction between them. Nevertheless, continued uncertainty about the American commitment was a powerful force for cooperation that culminated in warm Franco-German peace. Interconnected alignments of this nature often lead states to cooperate in ways that would not otherwise be possible. In certain cases, the quality of peace between former rivals, such as France and Germany, Greece and Turkey, or Egypt and Israel is best explained by changes in their relations with a shared security partner (i.e., the security partner's defense commitments) in the presence of a global adversary.
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