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" Corruption, job patronage, and the political economy of human capital investment "
Mustafa Bilgehan Ozturk
C. Boix
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Latin Dissertation
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English
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| Record Number
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53641
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| Doc. No
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TL23595
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| Call number
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3195049
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| Main Entry
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Mustafa Bilgehan Ozturk
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| Title & Author
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Corruption, job patronage, and the political economy of human capital investment\ Mustafa Bilgehan Ozturk
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| College
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The University of Chicago
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| Date
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2005
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| Degree
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Ph.D.
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| student score
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2005
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| Page No
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211
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| Abstract
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In this dissertation, I investigate the politico-economic determinants of human capital formation. I argue that corruption and job patronage create disincentives for citizens to invest in human capital. The first part of the theory is that corruption decreases business activity, which in turn causes a contraction of the demand for educated labor. The lower demand for skilled workers diminishes their employment opportunities and wage rates. At the margin, this negative effect creates disincentives for citizens to engage in educational investments. In the second part of the theory, I argue that job patronage, the provision of government jobs on the basis of political connections, lowers human capital accumulation. This particular job distribution strategy decreases employment chances for skilled, but politically non-connected workers, while it simultaneously enhances the employment options of non-skilled, but politically connected workers. At the margin, this dynamic creates disincentives for both classes of workers to undertake educational investments. To test these claims, I take advantage of multiple methodologies. First, I conduct cross-national analysis in the form of panel data estimation. Controlling for per capita income, fertility, credit market imperfections, regime type, religion, legal origins, ethnic fragmentation and many other variables, I find that corruption is still highly significant in predicting the level of educational investment over time. Second, I test the validity of my hypotheses, especially those having to do with job patronage, based on survey research conducted in Turkey. The data show that in the presence of the usual survey control variables, such as age, gender, income, etc., job patronage has a significant negative impact on human capital investment decisions. Last but not least, I conduct country case studies of Israel and Turkey. The results once again confirm my overall theoretical predictions.
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| Subject
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Social sciences; Corruption; Human capital investment; Job patronage; Political economy; Political science; Economics; 0615:Political science; 0501:Economics
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| Added Entry
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C. Boix
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The University of Chicago
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