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" Power -sharing extended: Policing and education reforms in Bosnia -Herzegovina and Northern Ireland "
Louis Kendall Palmer, III
A. Oberschall
Document Type
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Latin Dissertation
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Language of Document
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English
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Record Number
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53662
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Doc. No
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TL23616
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Call number
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3200828
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Main Entry
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Louis Kendall Palmer, III
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Title & Author
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Power -sharing extended: Policing and education reforms in Bosnia -Herzegovina and Northern Ireland\ Louis Kendall Palmer, III
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College
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The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
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Date
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2005
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Degree
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Ph.D.
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student score
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2005
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Page No
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296
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Abstract
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Power-sharing theory proposes democratic strategies for managing conflict in deeply-divided societies. The power-sharing literature has been dominated by a debate between two models of power-sharing, the consociational model proposed by Arend Lijphart and the integrative or incentives model defended by Donald Horowitz. Both models focus on electoral systems and constitutional design. Societies exiting from protracted, violent conflict through negotiated peace agreements offer extreme challenges for power-sharing, tests that the theories were not designed to handle. Nascent power-sharing structures are not sufficient to handle such highly polarizing issues as combatant demobilization; refugee return; biased, dysfunctional, and/or criminalized institutions of state administration; and rejectionist elites. In such situations, implementation of power-sharing across institutions of state administration becomes crucial. But legacies from the conflict and state administration make implementation problematic. External actors become necessary for implementation. Neither power-sharing theory includes implementation, external actors, or institutions of state administration. This study establishes a framework for understanding the dynamics of implementation of power-sharing. Using the cases of policing and education in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Northern Ireland, I show how local and external actors contend over power-sharing reforms within a framework created by legacies from the conflict, state administration, and the texts of peace agreements. My key finding is that external actors can have success in overcoming institutional legacies and local resistance to power-sharing state administrative reforms, but only if they identify change as a priority, allocate resources, and work together, as was the case with policing in Northern Ireland and in the Brčko District in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, this success in state-building comes at a cost; power-sharing theory seeks democratic solutions to governance problems in divided societies, but implementation of state-building only comes with external suspension of local democratic practices. This is the paradox of state-building.
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Subject
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Social sciences; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Education reforms; Ethnic conflict; Northern Ireland; Policing; Power-sharing; Sociology; Social structure; 0700:Social structure; 0626:Sociology
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Added Entry
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A. Oberschall
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Added Entry
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The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
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