| Abstract
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In this dissertation, I seek to explain why states fail to commit to the exchange of fugitive offenders with every other state, even where there appear to be several benefits to doing so. Commitment is equated with signature to bilateral extradition treaties. Extradition is viewed as a form of international cooperation. I argue that states will cooperate to enhance their perceived security interests. Extradition is a tool which states can use to enhance these interests. However, whether a state will utilize this tool depends on at least two factors. The first relates to the multidimensional nature of security. Although extradition can help a state increase its security by making it easier to bring fugitives to justice and discouraging criminals from taking safe-harbor in its territory, these are not a state's only security concerns. States have long viewed states with dissimilar political, economic, and cultural institutions as threats on numerous other dimensions; including a state's very survival. Accordingly, a state is more likely to use the tool of extradition when potential extradition partners have similar political, economic, or cultural institutions because doing so allows it to reap the security benefits of extradition without concern of threat on other dimensions. In some sense, shared institutions allow states to focus on absolute as opposed to relative gains. When states share institutions, they don't have to worry about the other state gaining a disproportionate amount. The second factor which influences a state's decision to cooperate is whether it is likely that fugitives will be exchanged. There is not much purpose to extradition where fugitive exchanges are unlikely. I argue that similar legal systems, similar culture, geographic proximity and major power status all increase the probability of fugitive exchanges and thus the likelihood of extradition agreements. The theory is fully supported for economic institutions, culture, proximity, and major power status. The theory is partially supported for political institutions and similar legal systems. Democratic political institutions and common laws systems affect signature as expected; however, non-democratic, civil law, and Islamic systems do not. In all other ways the theory is supported.
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