| | | Document Type | : | Latin Dissertation | | Language of Document | : | English | | Record Number | : | 54171 | | Doc. No | : | TL24125 | | Call number | : | 3310036 | | Main Entry | : | Raymond Peter Robinson, Jr. | | Title & Author | : | Incomplete democratic transitions, nationalism, and increased bellicosity: The Arab experienceRaymond Peter Robinson, Jr. | | College | : | The Catholic University of America | | Date | : | 2008 | | Degree | : | Ph.D. | | student score | : | 2008 | | Page No | : | 162 | | Abstract | : | In their book Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder contend that incompletely democratizing states are more prone to initiate wars than either consolidated autocratic or democratic regimes. This is because elites in democratizing regimes often have to compete for power, and may use nationalism to win votes because of its universal appeal. They may also enter into alliances with groups that have nationalistic agendas, and logrolling among these groups can result in more bellicose foreign policies. In response, newly competing elites may feel pressured to follow suit. This dissertation analyzed incomplete democratization in Arab countries using Mansfield and Snyder's argument. It utilized the Polity IV database to determine cases of Arab states that made the transition from autocracy to anocracy. To be considered an incomplete democratizer, a state had to experience a three-point score in its overall Polity score within a five-year timeframe, and this increase had to result in it being re-categorized from an autocratic state to an anocratic one. Five Arab countries met this criterion: Jordan from 1951 to 1955, Tunisia from 1988 to 1992, Algeria from 1989 to 1993, Jordan 1989 to 1993, and Algeria from 1995 to 1999. In no case did war occur, nor did nationalist rhetoric increase appreciably. When initiated, democratization was done with the goal of providing an outlet to the people while shielding the incumbents from significant political competition. Protected from having to compete for office, elites had no need to use nationalistic appeals to retain power. The existence of external rents was influential in directing and influencing democratization in the above-listed countries. Rents gave elites the ability to develop coercive state apparatuses, and also provide social benefits (i.e. welfare programs, subsidized commodities) to their citizens in lieu of political participation. (On several occasions, the reduction of rents created unrest, which led elites to engage in limited democratization.) When democratization occurred, it was done through mechanisms like parliamentary elections, which increased participation and contestation, but also shielded the incumbents from serious threats to their status. | | Subject | : | Social sciences; Algeria; Arab; Arab politics; Bellicosity; Democratization; International relations; Jordan; Nationalism; Tunisia; International law; 0616:International relations; 0616:International law | | Added Entry | : | M. C. Love | | Added Entry | : | The Catholic University of America |
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