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Document Type:Latin Dissertation
Language of Document:English
Record Number:54702
Doc. No:TL24656
Call number:‭3278229‬
Main Entry:Brian D. Shoup
Title & Author:Institutional incentives, ethnic myths, and interethnic conflict in counterbalanced statesBrian D. Shoup
College:Indiana University
Date:2007
Degree:Ph.D.
student score:2007
Page No:291
Abstract:Interethnic competition assumes a distinctive character in plural societies characterized by ethnic counterbalance. Counterbalance describes cases where one organized ethnic community demands priority in the political system while another ethnic community controls a significant portion of a country's economic assets. In such cases, tensions emerge as politically dominant groups fear the loss of political hegemony to a more economically aggressive group. At the same time, economically successful groups require the provision of key public goods and a political atmosphere conducive to economic investment. Citing evidence of the existence of interethnic bargains predicated upon myths of indigenousness that stipulate the respective social roles of different ethnic communities, the project argues that the incentives created by institutions, especially electoral systems and redistributive programs, can persuade or dissuade individuals in competing groups to work to sustain peaceful relations between segments of society. The dissertation develops a model that explains how and why interethnic bargains between groups can erode given different institutional configurations. It is hypothesized that interethnic conflict is more likely in countries where political institutions fail to insulate the political hegemony of traditionally dominant ethnic communities and redistributive programs fail to improve the economic position of ethnic majorities. In such cases, outbidding strategies by more extreme ethnic leaders are more successful and violence becomes more likely. Three cases are examined to test the model: Fiji, Malaysia and South Africa. These cases are selected because of key demographic similarities, similar patterns of colonial intervention and their divergence according to the dependent variable. Fiji represents a case where conflict has been persistent since the mid 1980s. Malaysia has generally been regarded as a successful case of a plural society. South Africa is a case where new institutional arrangements are presently being tested to see if they can minimize interethnic conflict and minority exploitation.
Subject:Social sciences; Counterbalanced states; Electoral systems, redistribution; Ethnic conflict; Fiji; Institutional incentives; Malaysia; South Africa; Political science; Minority & ethnic groups; Sociology; Minority & ethnic violence; Conflict; 0615:Political science; 0631:Sociology; 0631:Minority & ethnic groups
Added Entry:M. D. McGinnis
Added Entry:Indiana University