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Document Type:Latin Dissertation
Language of Document:English
Record Number:54739
Doc. No:TL24693
Call number:‭3195065‬
Main Entry:Yael Sandra Siman
Title & Author:The Palestinian-Israeli conflict 1967–2004: Breaking down the occupying state's refusal to negotiate with insurgentsYael Sandra Siman
College:The University of Chicago
Date:2005
Degree:Ph.D.
student score:2005
Page No:268
Abstract:This dissertation investigates the conditions under which rulers of occupying democratic states will likely bargain with insurgents in occupied territories. When rulers of occupying states choose to bargain, state contraction can result. Under state contraction, rulers of occupying states can solve their territorial conflict with the rebels peacefully. This dissertation's main proposition is that there is a curvilinear relationship between the degree of threat posed by the rebels and the willingness of the controlling state's rulers to negotiate a territorial settlement. Only an intermediate level of threat will induce negotiation and state contraction. In turn, a specific correlation of forces among rebels is needed to produce the "right" level of threat, one in which there are both radicals and moderates, and moderates are ascendant over radicals but do not completely control them. This dissertation adds balance to existing theories on state contraction that stress strategies by the controlling state and its domestic processes (Kahler, 1984; Lustick, 1993; Spruyt, 2005). Its main finding shows that divided insurgencies are likely to induce negotiation, a notion that contradicts theories on rebellions (Lichbach, 1995). The main case study is the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from 1967 until 2004. My analysis of primary and secondary sources shows that an Israeli national consensus against negotiating with the Palestine Liberation Organization towards an independent state broke down largely in response to the successful Palestinian mobilization in the first Intifada. Specifically, Israeli rulers were willing to bargain when both strong Palestinian moderate and radical factions were present. However, throughout the implementation of the Oslo Accords, Israeli rulers lost incentive to continue negotiations because the Palestinian Authority failed to partially control Islamic radical groups. Fearing that Palestinian moderates would be unable to implement a negotiated agreement, Israeli Laborites delayed agreed withdrawals or refused to cede additional territory. In the presence of radicalized Palestinian strategies during al-Aqsa Intifada, Israeli rulers then re-built a nearly hegemonic position against bargaining with Yasser Arafat's authority. In conclusion, the dissertation looks briefly at other cases in which insurgents seek autonomy from occupying states and sheds light on negotiated solutions.
Subject:Social sciences; Insurgents; Israeli; Negotiate; Occupying state; Palestinian-Israeli; State contraction; Territorial conflict; Political science; 0615:Political science
Added Entry:D. Laitin
Added Entry:The University of Chicago