| Abstract
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This dissertation examines why some governments are more vulnerable to international overthrow attempts than others. Drawing on insights from the comparative politics literature, I argue that a government's vulnerability to insurgency-, economic sanctions-, or coup-based overthrow is determined by the size of its domestic supporting coalition and the institutional autonomy of its security services. Supporting coalition size determines the number of domestic supporters willing to rally to the government's defense when confronted with an insurgency or security service coup. It also determines the resource burden a government faces when trying to maintain its domestic base of support during economic sanctions. Security service institutional autonomy determines the institutional ease of launching a security service coup and, therefore; the likelihood that the security services will resist international aggression or be able to overthrow the government In this dissertation, supporting coalition size and security service institutional autonomy interact to create four regime types with vary levels of vulnerability to particular overthrow strategies. Examining international overthrow attempts in Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Guatemala, Iran, Iraq, Nicaragua, Rhodesia, and South Africa, the findings of this dissertation show that, contrary to the standard realist argument, overthrow outcomes are not merely the result of how much effort or pressure is applied against a target government. Rather, a government's domestic structure pre-determines if a particular overthrow strategy will be effective, which---in turn---heavily influences how much effort or pressure is needed to remove a target government.
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