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" Cognitive pragmatism : "
Nicholas Rescher
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BL
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| Record Number
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599008
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| Doc. No
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b428227
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| Main Entry
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Rescher, Nicholas
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| Title & Author
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Cognitive pragmatism : : the theory of knowledge in pragmatic perspective /\ Nicholas Rescher
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| Publication Statement
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[Pittsburgh, Pa.] :: University of Pittsburgh Press,, c2001
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| Page. NO
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xi, 250 p. :: ill. ;; 24 cm
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| ISBN
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0822941538 (cloth : alk. paper)
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| Bibliographies/Indexes
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Includes bibliographical references (p. 245-248) and index
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| Contents
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Knowledge of the truth in pragmatic perspective -- Epistemic justification -- Categories : a pragmatic approach -- On learned ignorance and the limits of knowledge -- The deficits of skepticism -- Cognitive realism : a perspective on existence and our knowledge of it -- Induction as enthymematic reasoning : a pragmatic perspective on inference to the best systematizaton -- On circularity and regress in rational validation -- Reification fallacies and inappropriate totalities -- What if things were different? -- Meta-knowledge and cognitive limits : rudiments of formalized epistemology
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| Abstract
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Nicholas Rescher tackles the major questions of philosophical inquiry, pondering the nature of truth and existence. Rescher argues that the development of knowledge is a practice, pursued by humans because we have a need for its products. This pragmatic approach satisfies our innate urge as humans to make sense of our surroundings. Taking his discussion down to the level of particular details, and addressing such topics as inductive validation, hypostatization fallacies, and counterfactual reasoning, Rescher abandons abstract generalities in favor of concrete specifics. For example, philosophers usually insist that to reason logically from a counterfactual, we must imagine a possible world in which the statement is fact. But Rescher argues that there's no need to attempt to accept the facts of a world outside our cognition in order to reason from them. He shows us how we can use our own natural system of prioritizing to resolve the inconsistencies in such statements as, "If the Eiffel Tower were in Manhattan, then it would be in New York State." In using dozens of real-world examples such as these Rescher casts light on a wide variety of concrete issues in the classical theory of knowledge, and reassures us along the way that the inherent limitations on our knowledge are no cause for distress. In pragmatic theory and inquiry, we must accept that the best we can do is good enough, because we only have a certain (albeit large) set of tools and conceptualizations available to us
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| Subject
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Knowledge, Theory of
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| Subject
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Cognition
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| LC Classification
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BD161.R4695 2001
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