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" Philosophical essays / "
Scott Soames
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BL
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| Record Number
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632397
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dltt
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| Main Entry
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Soames, Scott
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| Title & Author
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Philosophical essays /\ Scott Soames
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| Publication Statement
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Princeton :: Princeton University Press,, c2009
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| Page. NO
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2 v. ;; 24 cm
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| ISBN
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0691136807
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: 9780691136806
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: 0691136815
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: 9780691136813
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: 0691136823
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: 9780691136820
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: 0691136831
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: 9780691136837
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| Bibliographies/Indexes
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Includes bibliographical references and index
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| Contents
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v. 1. Natural language : what it means and how we use it: The origins of these essays -- Introduction -- Presupposition -- A projection problem for speaker presupposition -- Pt. 2. Language and linguistic competence -- Linguistics and psychology -- Semantics and psychology -- Semantics and semantic competence -- The necessity argument -- Truth, meaning, and understanding -- Truth and meaning in perspective -- Pt. 3. Semantics and pragmatics -- Naming and asserting -- The gap between meaning and assertion : why what we literally say often differs from what our words literally mean -- Drawing the line between meaning and implicaturem and relating both to assertion -- Pt. 4. Descriptions -- Incomplete definite descriptions -- Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction -- Why incomplete descriptions don't refute Russell's theory of descriptions -- Meaning and use : lessons for legal interpretation -- Interpreting legal texts : what is and what is not special about the law --
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v. 2. The philosophical significance of language-- Pt. 1 Reference, propositions, and propositional attitudes -- Direct reference, propositional attitudes, and semantic content -- Why propositions can't be sets of truth-supporting circumstances -- Belief and mental representation -- Attitudes and anaphora -- Pt. 2. Modality -- The modal argument: wide scope and rigidified descriptions -- The philosophical significance of the Kripkean necessary a posteriori -- Knowledge of manifest natural kinds -- Understanding assertion -- Ambitious two-dimensionalism -- Actually -- Pt. 3. Truth and vagueness -- What is a theory of truth? -- Understanding deflationism -- Higher-order vagueness for partially defined predicates -- The possibility of partial definition -- Pt. 4. . 4. Kripke, Wittgenstein, and following a rule -- Skepticism about meaning: indeterminancy, normativity, and the rule-following paradox -- Facts, truth conditions, and the skeptical solution to the rule-following paradox
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| Subject
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Language and languages-- Philosophy
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Linguistics
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Semantics
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| LC Classification
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P107.S67 2009
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