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" Outline of a Nominalist Theory of Propositions : "
by Paul Gochet.
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BL
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716529
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b536213
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| Main Entry
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by Paul Gochet.
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| Title & Author
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Outline of a Nominalist Theory of Propositions : : an Essay in the Theory of Meaning and in the Philosophy of Logic\ by Paul Gochet.
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| Publication Statement
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Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1980
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| Series Statement
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Synthese library, 98.
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| Page. NO
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(228 pages)
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| ISBN
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9400989490
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: 9789400989498
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| Contents
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1. Importance of the Subject --;2. The Roles Played by the Concept of Proposition --;3. How to Conceive of a Theory of Proposition --;4. Which Method to Use --;5. The Merits of Nominalism --;6. Varieties of Nominalism --;7. The Senses of the Word 'Proposition' --;I / The Criterion of Ontological Commitment --;1. Quine's Criterion of Ontological Commitment --;2. Warnock's Objections to Quine's Criterion of Ontological Commitment --;3. The Application of the Criterion of Ontological Commitment to Propositions --;4. Compromising Uses of the Word 'Proposition' --;5. Critique of Ayer's First Attempt to Escape Ontological Commitments to Propositions --;6. The Double Interpretation of the Existential Quantifier --;7. The Double Interpretation of Bound Variables --;8. From Pragmatics to Ontology --;II / The Syntactic Approach --;1. Is an Axiomatic Definition of Proposition Possible? --;2. Two Nominalist Solutions on the Problem of Interpreting Propositional Variables --;3. What Quine's Notation Reveals With Regard to the Status of Propositions --;4. Does the Definition of Logical Truth Presuppose the Concept of Proposition? Strawson's Thesis --;5. Replies to Strawson's Objections --;6. The Definition of Proposition in Terms of the Premises and Conclusion of an Inference --;III / A Semantic Definition of Proposition in Terms of Truth and Falsity --;1. The Aristotelian Definition of Proposition in Terms of Truth --;2. The Influence of the Semantic Definition of Truth on the Concept of Proposition --;3. Use of the Distinction Between Sentence and Statement as a Solution to the Paradox of the Liar in Natural Language --;4. The Ontological Status of the Distinction between Statements and Sentences --;5. Truth and Falsity Apply to Sentences Before Applying to Statements --;6. The Semantic Theory of Truth and the Correspondence Between Language and Reality --;IV / The Pragmatic Definition of Proposition in Terms of Assertion or Assertability --;1. The Pragmatic Definition of Proposition in Terms of Assertability --;2. The Distinction Between Proposition and Statement from a Pragmatic Perspective --;3. Austin's Distinction Between Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts --;4. An Examination of Searle's Notion of Proposition --;5. Stenius' Analysis --;6. The Performative Hypothesis --;7. Hausser's Treatment of Moods --;8. A Vindication of Searle's Position --;9. A New Account of Searle's Concept of Propositional Content --;V / The Nature of Facts --;1. The Nature and Status of Facts in Russell's 'Philosophy of Logical Atomism' --;2. The Merits of Russell's Notion of Fact --;3. The Defects of Russell's Theory of Facts --;4. Wittgenstein's Conception of Fact --;5. Arguments For and Against the Ontological Interpretation of Facts --;6. Application of Methods of Generative Grammar to Detect the Ontological Nature of Facts --;7. Why There Cannot be Facts --;VI / The Proposition in Terms of Belief --;1. Belief and Proposition --;2. The Problem of False Beliefs --;3. The Distinction Between Propositional Verbs and Cognitive Verbs --;4. The Logical Syntax of Propositional Verbs --;5. An Attempt at Absorbing Propositions into Sentences --;6. Searle's Views on Intentionality --;VII / Propositions as Meanings of Sentences --;1. The Relational Conception of Meaning --;2. The Eternality and Temporality of Meaning --;3. The Behaviouristic Analysis of the Meaning of Sentences --;4. The Chess-Theory of Meaning --;5. An Attempt at Dissolving the Problem Raised by the Meaning of Sentences --;6. The Picture Theory of Meaning --;7. The Limitations of the Picture Theory of Meaning --;8. Beyond the Picture Theory --;9. The Recursive Definition of Truth as a Tool for Compositional Semantics --;10. Recursive Semantics and Nominalism --;11. Categorial Grammar, Set Theoretic Semantics and Nominalism --;12. Game-Theoretical Semantics --;VIII / An Attempt at a New Solution for the Enigma of the Meaning of False Sentences --;1. Conditions of Adequacy on a Satisfactory Answer --;2. Ryle's Solution to the Enigma of the Meaning of False Sentences --;3. The Possibility of Falsity as a By-Product of the Creativity of Language --;4. The Solution Offered by Possible Worlds Semantics to the Enigma of the Meaning of False Sentences --;5. A Pragmatic Solution of the Enigma --;6. Nominalism Again --;IX / The Identification Criterion of Propositions --;1. The Importance of Finding a Criterion of Propositional Identity --;2. The Definition of Proposition in Terms of Synonymy --;3. Intensional Isomorphism --;4. The Role of the Notion of Isomorphism in Defining a Criterion for the Identity of Propositions --;5. Preliminaries to the Application of the Criterion of Extensional Isomorphism --;6. Some Final Refinements of the Notion of Extensional Isomorphism --;7. Vanderveken's Criterion --;8. Suppes' Gradualism --;9. Indeterminacy of Translation --;X / Propositions and Indirect Discourse --;1. The Notion of Proposition and of Indirect Discourse --;2. The Syntactic Approach to the Problem of Intensional Contexts --;3. Prior's Nominalist Syntax --;4. L.J. Cohen's Extensionalist Syntax --;5. Frege's Dualist Semantics and Epistemic Logic --;6. Carnap's Dualist Semantics --;7. Quine's Unitary Extensionalism --;8. Criticisms Addressed to Quine's Nominalist Theory: Kaplan's Alternative Solution --;9. Hintikka's Pluralistic Extensionalism --;10. The Pragmatic Approach to the Problem of Intensional Contexts: Natural Pragmatics --;11. The Pragmatic Approach to the Problem of Intensional Contexts: Formal Pragmatics --;12. Objections Against Montague's Semantics --;Conclusion --;Name Index.
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| Abstract
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One of the problems raised by propositions, the problem of deter- mining whether propositions, statements or sentences are the primary bearers of truth and falsity, is even in the eyes of Bar-Hillel, "one of the major items that the future philosophy oflanguage will have to discuss".
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| Subject
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Philosophy (General)
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Science -- Philosophy.
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| LC Classification
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B67.B973 1980
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| Added Entry
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Paul Gochet
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