| Document Type
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BL
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| Record Number
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717297
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| Doc. No
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b536983
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| Main Entry
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Andreas Foerster
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| Title & Author
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Institutional analysis of development administration : : the case of Japan's bilateral grant aid and technical assistance\ Andreas Foerster
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| Publication Statement
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Heidelberg Physica-Verl., 1995
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| Series Statement
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Contributions to economics
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| Page. NO
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XVI, 234 Seiten Diagramme 24 cm
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| ISBN
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3790808539
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: 9783790808537
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| Notes
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Literaturverz. S. [219] - 234
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| Contents
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1 Introduction and Objective.- 1.1 Introduction: The Need for Institutional Analyses of Donor Administrations.- 1.2 Approaches to Institutional Analysis.- 1.2.1 New Institutional Economics and Organization Theory.- 1.2.2 Combining Two Different Research Approaches.- 1.3 The Case of Japan's Development Assistance.- 1.4 Objectives and Research Method of the Study.- 2 Development Administration and Organization Theory.- 2.1 Approaches to Organization Theory.- 2.1.1 Classical and Specialized Organization Theories.- 2.1.2 Systems Theory.- 2.1.3 Contingency Theory.- 2.2 Operationalization of Contingency Theory.- 2.2.1 Dimensions of Organizational Structure.- 2.2.2 Phases of the Project Cycle.- 2.2.3 Dichotic Management Approaches to Each Project Cycle Phase.- 2.2.4 Relevant Context Factor.- 2.3 Conclusion.- 3 The Procedural Structure Of Japan's Development Administration.- 3.1 Project Identification.- 3.1.1 Active Versus Reactive Role of the Donor.- 3.1.2 Perception in Japan.- 3.1.3 Actual Operations.- 3.2 Preparation and Appraisal.- 3.2.1 Multidimensional Analysis Versus Technical-Economic Focus.- 3.2.2 Perception in Japan.- 3.2.3 Actual Operations.- 3.3 Selection.- 3.3.1 Goal-Oriented Versus Inductive Approach.- 3.3.2 Perception in Japan.- 3.3.3 Actual Operations.- 3.4 Detailed Design.- 3.4.1 Topdown-Blueprint Versus Participative-Incremental Planning.- 3.4.2 Perception in Japan.- 3.4.3 Actual Operations.- 3.5 Implementation.- 3.5.1 Target Orientation Versus Institutional Learning.- 3.5.2 Perception in Japan.- 3.5.3 Actual Operations.- 3.6 Monitoring.- 3.6.1 Control Versus Mediator Mechanism.- 3.6.2 Perception in Japan.- 3.6.3 Actual Operations.- 3.7 Ex-Post Evaluation.- 3.7.1 Institutional Learning Versus Justification.- 3.7.2. Perception in Japan.- 3.7.3 Actual Operations.- 3.8 Termination/Follow-up.- 3.8.1 Extended External Financing Versus Complete Termination.- 3.8.2 Perception in Japan.- 3.8.3 Actual Operations.- 3.9 Conclusion for the First Working Hypothesis.- 4 The New Institutional Economics Approach.- 4.1 The Need for an Extension of Contingency Theory.- 4.1.1 Assumptions of Contingency Theory.- 4.1.2 Discretion of Bureaucrats.- 4.1.3 Discretion in Development Administrations.- 4.1.4 Extension of Contingency Theory.- 4.2 Different Behavioral Assumptions and Their Consequences.- 4.2.1 Behavioral Assumptions of New Institutional Economics (NIE).- 4.2.2 The Principal-Agent Problem.- 4.3 Economic Bureaucracy Theories.- 4.3.1 Niskanen's Model.- 4.3.2 Criticism of Niskanen's Model.- 4.3.2.1 Production at Minimal Cost.- 4.3.2.2 Budget Maximization.- 4.3.3 Extensions of Niskanen's Theory.- 4.3.4 Remaining Criticism of the Models in the Niskanen Tradition.- 4.3.4.1 Monopoly Assumption.- 4.3.4.2 Consistently Unproductive Discretion.- 4.3.4.3 Passive Politicians.- 4.4 A Principal-Agent Approach to Bureaucracy.- 4.4.1 Agency Theory and Agency Cost.- 4.4.2 Institutional Devices for Reducing Agency Cost.- 4.4.3 Agency Cost of Control Versus Incentive Strategy.- 4.4.4 Multiple Agencies.- 4.5 Conclusion.- 5 The Multiple Agency System In Japan's Development Administration.- 5.1 The Importance of Trust and Informal Trade in Japan.- 5.1.1 Administrative/Organizational Culture in Japan.- 5.1.2 Informal Trade in Japanese Organizations.- 5.2 Organizations Responsible for Grant Aid and Technical Assistance.- 5.2.1 Ministry Level.- 5.2.1.1 Ministry of Finance.- 5.2.1.2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs.- 5.2.1.3 Ministry of International Trade and Industry.- 5.2.1.4 Line Ministries.- 5.2.1.5 Judgment of the Situation at the Ministry Level.- 5.2.2 Implementation Level in Japan.- 5.2.2.1 Japan International Cooperation Agency.- 5.2.2.2 Quasi-Nongovernmental Organizations.- 5.2.2.3 Judgment of the Situation at the Implementation Level.- 5.2.3 Japanese Organizations in the Recipient Country.- 5.2.3.1 Japanese Embassy.- 5.2.3.2 The Local JICA Office.- 5.2.3.3 Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO).- 5.2.3.4 The Japanese Private Sector.- 5.2.3.5 Judgment for Japanese Organizations Abroad.- 5.3 Conclusion to the Second Working Hypothesis.- 6 The Effects of Institutional Innovations.- 6.1 The Introduction of Project Cycle Management (PCM) in Japan.- 6.1.1 PCM Methodology.- 6.1.2 Integration of the ZOPP and PCM Methodologies in the Project Cycle.- 6.2 PCM and Contingency Theory.- 6.2.1 Identification.- 6.2.2 Preparation.- 6.2.3 Selection.- 6.2.4 Detailed Design.- 6.2.5 Implementation.- 6.2.6 Monitoring.- 6.2.7 Evaluation.- 6.3 PCM and New Institutional Economics.- 6.4 Conclusion.- 7 Summary and Final Remarks.
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| Subject
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Entwicklungspolitik.
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| Subject
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Institutionenökonomie.
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| Subject
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Organisation.
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| LC Classification
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HC60.A537 1995
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| Added Entry
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Andreas Foerster
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