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" Peirce's and Lewis's theories of induction "
by Chung-Ying Cheng.
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BL
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| Record Number
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728240
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b547978
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| Main Entry
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by Chung-Ying Cheng.
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Peirce's and Lewis's theories of induction\ by Chung-Ying Cheng.
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| Publication Statement
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The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969
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(xiii, 206 pages)
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| ISBN
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9401193673
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: 9789401193672
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| Notes
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Issued also as thesis, Harvard.
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| Contents
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I: Introduction.- 1. Problem of Justifying Induction and Proposal for Its Dissolution.- 2. Two Types of Recent Arguments for the Validity of Induction.- 3. Arguments from Paradigm Cases and Uses of Words.- 4. Practical Arguments.- 5. Induction as a Genuine Problem and Study of Peirce and Lewis.- II: Scope of Peirce's Theory of Induction.- III: The Nature and Validity of Inference.- 1. A General Theory of Inference.- 2. Necessary Inference and Probable Inference.- 3. Validity of Probable Inference.- IV: Probable Inference and Justifying Induction.- 1. Induction and Apagogical Inversion of Statistical Deduction.- 2. Induction As a Valid Probable Inference.- V: Requirements for the Validity of Induction.- 1. General Remakrs.- 2. Peirce on Fair Sampling and Fair Samples.- 3. Principle of Fair Sampling: A New Formulation.- 4. Peirce on Predesignation.- 5. Relevancy of Predesignation for the Validity of Induction.- VI: Probability and the Validity of Induction.- 1. General Remarks.- 2. Peirce's Two Empirical Conceptions of Probability.- 3. Peirce's Objections to the Laplacian Definition of Probability and Criticism.- VII: A Non-Probabilistic Justification of Induction.- 1. General Remarks.- 2. Self-Correcting Nature of Inductive Method.- 3. Criteria for Defining Truth and Justifying Induction.- 4. Other Arguments for the Necessity of General Validity of Induction.- VIII: Concluding Remarks on Peirce's Non-Probabilistic Justification on Induction.- IX: Problems in Lewis's Theory of Induction.- X: Induction and Analysis of Knowledge of Reality.- 1. General Remarks.- 2. Empirical Knowledge and "A priori" Concepts.- 3. A Fundamental Principle in Establishing Criteria of Reality.- XI: An "A Priori Analytical" Justification of Induction.- 1. General Remarks.- 2. Problems of Justifying Induction in the Theories of Reality and Knowledge.- 3. Empirical Generalizations as Interpretations of Experience and Principle A.- 4. Analyticity of Principle A.- XII: Implications of Lewis's "A Priori Analytical Justification of Induction.- 1. From Principle A to Justification of Argument from Past to Future.- 2. Lewis on the Practical Successfulness of Induction.- XIII: Concluding Remarks on Lewis's "A Priori Analytical" Justification of Induction.- XIV: Nature of Probability and Rational Credibility.- 1. General Remarks.- 2. Empirical Interpretation of Probability.- 3. Logical Interpretation of Probability.- 4. Rational Credibility, Fair Sampling and Logical Probability.- XV: Criteria for Determining Rational Credibility.- 1. Questions Regarding Criteria for Determining Rational Credibility.- 2. Degrees of Rational Credibility and Criteria for Determining Them.- 3. Justifying Acceptance of Criteria for Determining Rational Credibility.- XVI: Conclusion.- 1. Similarity Between Peirce's and Lewis's Theories of Induction.- 2. Significances of Peirce's and Lewis's Arguments.- 3. Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Justifying Induction.- 4. Bearings upon Practicist and Linguist Arguments.- Appendix I. A Chronological Listing of Peirce's Papers Directly Bearing upon Induction and Probability.- Appendix II. Proof of the Logical Law of Large Numbers (the Maximum Value Law of Hypergeometric Probability).- Appendix III. Probabilities of Estimates of Values of Population Parameters.- Selected Bibliography.
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| Subject
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Induction (Logic)
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Lewis, Clarence Irving, -- 1883-1964.
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Peirce, Charles S. -- (Charles Sanders), -- 1839-1914.
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| LC Classification
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B945.P44B934 1969
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| Added Entry
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Zhongying Cheng
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