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" Intrafamily Bargaining and Household Decisions. "
W Güth
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BL
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| Record Number
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732327
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b552115
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| Main Entry
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W Güth
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| Title & Author
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Intrafamily Bargaining and Household Decisions.\ W Güth
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| Publication Statement
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Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1992
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| ISBN
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3642457088
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: 9783642457081
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| Contents
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1 Introduction.- 2 Models of the `new home economics'.- 2.1 Decisions in an existing family.- 2.1.1 Labor supply models.- 2.1.2 Simple time allocation models.- 2.1.3 Extensions of time allocation models.- 2.1.4 Models of fertility.- 2.1.5 Empirical evidence.- 2.1.6 Remarks on household utility function.- 2.2 Family formation and marital stability.- 2.2.1 Marriage models.- 2.2.2 Models of marriage stability.- 2.2.3 Empirical evidence.- 2.3 Problems and further questions.- 3 Family decisions as a bargaining problem.- 3.1 The family as an organization of exchange.- 3.2 Household decisions as a non-cooperative game.- 3.3 Household decisions as a cooperative game.- 4 A Nash bargaining model for household decisions.- 4.1 Comparison with traditional approaches.- 4.2 Comparative statics.- 5 Time allocation in a static bargaining model with household production.- 5.1 The model.- 5.2 Division of work within the household.- 5.2.1. The case of a joint net-income function.- 5.2.2 The case of individual net-income functions.- 5.3 Effects of an exogenous change in wages.- 5.3.1 Effects when the conflict point is held constant.- 5.3.2 The bargaining effect.- 5.3.3 The total effect.- 6 A dynamic model with accumulation of human capital.- 6.1 Intrafamily division of work and accumulation of human capital.- 6.2 The dynamic approach.- 6.2.1 Game with binding long-term contracts.- 6.2.2 Game without binding long-term contracts.- 6.2.3 The two-period model.- 6.3 Time allocation depending on individual bargaining power.- 6.3.1 Labor supply.- 6.3.2 Intrafamily division of work.- 7 Pareto efficiency of family decisions.- 7.1 Binding force of contracts and efficiency.- 7.2 Discrete choices.- 7.3 Fertility as a prisoner's dilemma.- 8 The binding force of intrafamily contracts.- 8.1 Self-enforcing contracts.- 8.1.1 Threat by future non-cooperative behavior.- 8.1.2 Reputation.- 8.1.3 Loyalty.- 8.2 Enforcement by institutions.- 8.2.1 The formal marriage contract.- 8.2.2 Divorce law.- 8.2.3 Social norms.- 8.3 Remarks on policy options.- 9 Introducing uncertainty: the possibility of conflict.- 9.1 Exogenous probability of conflict.- 9.2 Causes of conflict and negotiation strategies.- 9.3 Endogenous probability of conflict.- 9.3.1 Conflict probability and wage changes.- 9.3.2 Time allocation and conflict probability.- 10 Empirical tests of the bargaining approach.- 10.1 Tests based on the Slutsky restrictions.- 10.1.1 Derivation of testable hypotheses.- 10.1.2 Empirical results of Manser/Brown and Horney/McElroy.- 10.1.3 Some critical remarks.- 10.2 Test of Pareto efficiency.- 10.2.1 The parametric approach.- 10.2.2 The non-parametric approach.- 11 Survey of empirical bargaining models.- 11.1 Household labor supply: a model with fixed bargaining power.- 11.2 Household labor supply: a game theoretic model in a discrete choice setting.- 11.3 The distribution of welfare in the household: measuring the bargaining power.- 11.4 Marriage and divorce: estimates with explicit threat point.- 12 Empirical evidence of the bargaining approach - first findings with German data.- 12.1 Balance of power within marriages.- 12.2 Fertility decision.- 12.3 Divorce behavior.- 13 Concluding remarks.
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| LC Classification
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HB820.W488 1992
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| Added Entry
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H -W Sinn
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J McMillan
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W Güth
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