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" Moral knowledge. "
Oliver A Johnson
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BL
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| Record Number
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738896
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b558809
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| Main Entry
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Oliver A Johnson
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| Title & Author
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Moral knowledge.\ Oliver A Johnson
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| Publication Statement
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[Place of publication not identified]: Springer, 1966
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| ISBN
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9401185573
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: 9789401185578
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| Contents
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I. The Problem of Moral Knowledge.- 1. Contemporary sources of moral skepticism.- 2. Hume and the deductive fallacy.- 3. The meaning of moral obligation.- 4. The criteria of knowledge.- 5. Plan of the book.- II. Duty and Goodness.- 1. Types of theory.- 2. The deontologists' critique of utilitarianism.- 3. Intuitionistic utilitarianism as a theory of moral knowledge.- 4. The identification of goodness and duty.- 5. The "ought-to-be" argument.- 6. The deductive argument-a restatement.- 7. The appeal to self-evidence.- 8. Reductionistic utilitarianism.- 9. Moral goodness and duty.- 10. Duty and goodness and the "ought" and the "is".- III. Duty and Rightness.- 1. The intuitionism of the deontologists.- 2. Prichard's "unreasonable" theory.- 3. The self-evidence of our duties.- 4. The duty to keep promises.- 5. Intuition and generalization.- 6. Rightness and duty.- 7. From rightness to duty.- IV. A New Point of View.- 1. Oxford philosophy.- 2. The revolution in philosophy.- 3. Wittgenstein.- 4. Analysis and moral philosophy.- 5. Analysis and the problem of moral knowledge.- V. Duty and Ordinary Language.- 1. An interpretation of Toulmin's conclusions.- 2. A reinterpretation of Toulmin's conclusions.- 3. Good reasons and generally accepted reasons.- 4. Toulmin's theory and the deductive fallacy.- 5. Does Toulmin escape the deductive fallacy?.- 6. Summary comments on Toulmin's moral theory.- 7. Nowell-Smith and the problem of moral knowledge.- 8. Wittgenstein and the revolution in philosophy.- VI. A Return to Intuitionism.- 1. The deductive fallacy, skepticism, and intuitionism.- 2. A defense of intuitionism.- 3. Knowledge and a plurality of intuitions.- 4. Intuitive self-evidence and moral knowledge.- VII. Reason and Duty.- 1. Two notions of self-evidence.- 2. Preliminary objections.- 3. Duty and good reasons.- 4. A moral axiom.- 5. A story.- 6. Elaboration and comments.- 7. The principle of personal impartiality.- 8. Egoism and morality.- 9. The deductive fallacy.- VIII. Toward a General Theory of Morality.- 1. Outline of a positive theory of obligation.- 2. Practical qualifications.- 3. Morality and utility.- 4. Goodness and the naturalistic fallacy.
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| LC Classification
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BJ37.O458 1966
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| Added Entry
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Oliver A Johnson
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