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" Litigation and settlement in a game with incomplete information : "


Document Type : BL
Record Number : 751839
Doc. No : b571798
Main Entry : Wolfgang Ryll.
Title & Author : Litigation and settlement in a game with incomplete information : : an experimental study\ Wolfgang Ryll.
Publication Statement : Berlin ; New York : Springer, ©1996.
Series Statement : Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems, 440.
Page. NO : (viii, 174 pages) : illustrations
ISBN : 3642614671
: : 9783642614675
Contents : Introduction --; The Game-Teoretic Model and Equilibrium Sets --; Experimental Design and Organisation of the Experiment --; Experimental Results --; Learning Theories --; Monte-Carlo Simulations and Testing of the Learning Direction Theory Against a Simple Alternative Theory --; Comparison of the Results of Direction Learning and the Simple Alternative Theory --; Summary.
Abstract : The book investigates a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. The experimental design allows investigation of how subjects solve the bargaining problem. A prominence level analysis is applied to the data and suggests that subjects tend to choose "round" numbers. It is shown that there exists a correlation between machiavellianism and subjects' adjustment behaviour in the game. The learning behaviour is discussed extensively. Plaintiffs' acceptance limits polarize at the beginning of the second play. A model of learning direction theory applied to explain subjects's behaviour over the course of the game.
Subject : Actions and defenses -- Psychological aspects.
Subject : Compromise (Law) -- Psychological aspects.
Subject : Dispute resolution (Law) -- Psychological aspects.
LC Classification : ‭K2390‬‭.W654 1996‬
Added Entry : Wolfgang Ryll
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