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" Agency in Action : "
by S.C. Coval, P.G. Campbell.
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BL
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| Record Number
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775052
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b595047
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| Main Entry
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by S.C. Coval, P.G. Campbell.
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| Title & Author
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Agency in Action : : the Practical Rational Agency Machine\ by S.C. Coval, P.G. Campbell.
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| Publication Statement
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Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 1992
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| Series Statement
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Studies in cognitive systems, 11.
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| Page. NO
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(xvii, 207 pages)
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| ISBN
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9401124221
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: 9789401124225
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| Contents
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1. Action as Explanation --; 1. Common Ground and Broad Theories --; 2. Conditions on A Theory of Action --; 3. Grading the Theories --; 4. Is The Intentional Intrinsic or Extrinsic to Action? --; 5. The Intentional --; 2. AGENCY: ITS TERMS AND RELATIONS --; 1. The Need For Agency Theory --; 2. The Presuppositional Terms --; 2.3 Distinctions Among the Attitudes --; 3. The States of Practical Rational Agency and their Functions --; 4. Concatenation of Content and the Function Of Belief --; 5. Distinctions between the Practical States in the Process --; 3. The Rational Processes Of Agency --; 1. Pre-Practical Reasoning: From Proto-Desire To Desire-To --; 2. Practical Reasoning: From Desire To Efficacious Intention --; 3. The Practical Syllogism: Desire --; 4. The Practical Syllogism: Intention --; 5. Intending --; 6. Theoretical Smoothness --; 7. Model 11 --; 8. Autonomy --; 4. The Semantics Of Action --; 1. Action: The Explanatory Object --; 2. Intentional Action --; 3. Unintentionality --; 4. The Extra-Intentional --; 5. Responsibility --; 5. A Design Document for Pragma --; 1. Introduction --; 2. Action --; 3. Mistake --; 4. Accident --; 5. Inadvertence --; Appendix 1. Notation --; Appendix 2. --; 1. Objects in the Logical Space Of Action --; 2. Agency Stream Profiles and their Corresponding Explanatory Obects --; Notes.
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| Abstract
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When agency or intentional causation has occurred the theory presented here identifies an object ascribable to the agent -- his action -- which, through its properties, reveals its intentional cause. Such a unified view of agency and action leads to unitary views of intention and the intentional and of all explanatory objects ascribable to agents. While at odds in these matters with the prevailing theories of action, the semantics of this explanatory theory is shown to better satisfy widely accepted criteria for a viable theory of action. The revelatory character of action and its essential reference to agency shows that action theory needs agency theory. To this end, a logic of practical rational agency is developed which is intended to be neutral between competing theories of mind. A sketch of this model of agency and action, analyzes cases of agency in natural discourse. PRAGMA and its manual are available separately. This work is of interest to theorists concerned with the fundamental practical rational structure of persons, their actions and the discourse appropriate to them: to philosophers and to political, legal, AI and economic theorists.
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| Subject
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Philosophy (General)
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Philosophy of law.
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Philosophy of mind.
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| LC Classification
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B105.A35B973 1992
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| Added Entry
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P G Campbell
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S C Coval
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