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" Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy : "
edited by Jesús Ezquerro, Jesús M. Larrazabal.
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BL
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| Record Number
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775097
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b595092
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| Main Entry
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edited by Jesús Ezquerro, Jesús M. Larrazabal.
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| Title & Author
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Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy : : Proceedings of the First International Colloquium on Cognitive Science\ edited by Jesús Ezquerro, Jesús M. Larrazabal.
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| Publication Statement
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Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 1992
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| Series Statement
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Philosophical studies series, 52.
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| Page. NO
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(xxi, 324 pages)
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| ISBN
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9401126100
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: 9789401126106
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| Contents
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1: Animal Cognition and Human Cognition: A Necessary Dialogue --; I. Introduction --; II. Characterization of Comparative Cognition --; III. Cognitive Modules and Evolution --; IV. Two Goals of Comparative Research: General Processes and Evolutionary Sequences --; V. Consciousness and Cognition --; VI. Conclusions --; 2: User Modelling in Knowledge-Based Systems --; I. Introduction --; II. Situations of Interactive Communications --; III. The Content of the User Model --; IV. Characteristic Dimensions of a User's Model --; V. Domain-Knowledge: Shallow Versus Deep Modelling --; VI. Modelling Intentions --; VII. Building a User's Model --; VIII. Learner's Model --; IX. Conclusion --; 3: Changing Beliefs Rationally: Some Puzzles --; I. Background --; II. A Justification of Generalized Conditionalisation --; III. The Judy Benjamin Problem --; IV. An Apparent Counterexample to Simple Conditionalisation --; V. The Three Prisoners --; VI. Judy Benjamin Again: The Strong Strategy --; VII. Independence --; 4: On the Representation of Linguistic Information --; I. Introduction --; II. The Modularity Hypothesis --; III. Grammar, Pragmatics and Modularity --; IV. Interdisciplinarity in the Analysis of Linguistic Information --; V. Disjunct Adverbials Pragmatically Oriented Towards the Speaker or Hearer --; VI. On The Representation of Disjunct Constituents: A Multidimentional Approach --; VII. Conclusions --; 5: Modelling Memory for Models --; I. Introduction --; II. Two Senses of 'Model' --; III. Models in Working Memory --; IV. Representations for Syllogistic Reasoning --; V. Distributed Bindings and Syllogistic Reasoning --; 6: On The Study of Linguistic Performance --; I.A Proposal for 'Cognitive Science' and A Specification of it --; II. Current Situation in Linguistic Performance Theory --; III. Some Issues Regarding Research Programs on Linguistic Performance --; IV. Appendix --; 7: Partiality and Coherence in Concept Combination --; I. Introduction --; II. Flexibility and Specificity --; III. Sense Selection --; IV. Sense Generation --; V. Partiality, Coherence and Concept Combination --; VI. Conclusions --; 8: The Labyrinth of Attitude Reports --; I. Mental States --; II. Semantic Contents --; III. Attitude Reports as Explanations --; IV. The Crimmins-Perry Theory --; V. Reports and Reporting --; VI. Two Kinds of Attitude Reports --; VII. Reporting and Explaining --; 9: Aunty's Own Argument for the Language of Thought --; I. Introduction: Aunty and the Language of Thought --; II. The Threat of Regress --; III. First Stage: Systematic Cognitive Processes --; IV. First Stage: From System to Syntax --; V. Second Stage: The Structure of Thought --; VI. Second Stage: Concepts and Inference --; VII. Two Objections to the Second Stage --; VIII. Conceptualised Thought and the Connectionist Programme --; IX. An Invitation to Eliminativism? --; 10: Cognitive Science And Semantic Representations --; I. Cognitive and Other Sciences as Using Representations --; II. Natural and Rational Representations --; III. Sources of Variability in Representations --; IV. Use of Prescriptive Rules --; V. Description of Natural Representations --; VI. Token Representations, Long Term Memory Representations, and the Notion of Activation --; VII. Cross-Compatibility with Neurobiology and Artificial Intelligence --; VIII. Conclusion --; 11: Anchoring Conceptual Content: Scenarios And Perception --; I. Scenarios Introduced --; II. Scenarios: Consequences and Comparisons --; III. A Further Level of Content: An Application --; IV. Spatial Reasoning and Action.
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| Abstract
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THE PLACE OF PHILOSOPHY IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE During the last few years, many books have been published and many meetings have been held on Cognitive Science. A cursory review of their contents shows such a diversity of topics and approaches that one might well infer that there are no genuine criteria for classifying a paper or a lecture as a contribution to Cognitive Science. It is as though the only criterion is to have appeared in a book or in the programme of a meeting or title we can find the expression " ... Cognitive Science" in whose name or something like that. Perhaps this situation is due to the (relative) youth of the field, which is seeking its own identity, still involved in a process of formation and consolidation within the scientific community; but there are actually deep disagreements about how a science of the mind should be worked out, including how to understand its own subject, that is, "the mind. "While for some the term makes reference to a set of phenomena impossible to grasp by any scientific approach, for others "the mind" would be a sort of myth, and the mental terms await elimination by other more handy and empirically tractable terms.
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| Subject
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Artificial intelligence.
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| Subject
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Philosophy (General)
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Semantics.
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| LC Classification
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BF311.E358 1992
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| Added Entry
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Jesús Ezquerro
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Jesús M Larrazabal
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| Parallel Title
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Proceedings of the First International Colloquim on Cognitive Science
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