The social origins of authoritarian institutions: Bosses and elites in postrevolutionary Mexico and ...

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" The social origins of authoritarian institutions: Bosses and elites in postrevolutionary Mexico and Bolivia "
Manuel Viedma Slater, Dan

Document Type	:	Latin Dissertation
Language of Document	:	English
Record Number	:	803279
Doc. No	:	TL48063
Call number	:	‭1647259848;‮ ‬3668301‬
Main Entry	:	Alyan, Hala Nafez
Title & Author	:	The social origins of authoritarian institutions: Bosses and elites in postrevolutionary Mexico and Bolivia\ Manuel ViedmaSlater, Dan
College	:	The University of Chicago
Date	:	2014
Degree	:	Ph.D.
field of study	:	Political Science
student score	:	2014
Page No	:	266
Note	:	Committee members: Brownlee, Jason; Padgett, John; Simpser, Alberto
Note	:	Place of publication: United States, Ann Arbor; ISBN=978-1-321-43292-3
Abstract	:	This dissertation asks why authoritarian regimes are institutionalized in different ways and why they experience different outcomes. I have developed an elite conflict theory of authoritarianism and argue that how the distribution of power is institutionalized within a ruling coalition is more important for understanding authoritarian rule than the presence of democratic-like institutions such as parties, elections or legislatures. Two factors influence authoritarian institutionalization. One factor is a boss' decision to confront elites and redistribute power within the ruling coalition or compromise with elites and share power. The other factor is whether coercive elites are connected and can mobilize on a national scale or isolated and can only mobilize on a regional scale. Connected coercive elites can mobilize the means of destruction on a large scale, allowing them to block the redistribution of power and the creation of new institutions when a boss decides to confront them. They can also demand a share of national power in the event of a compromise. Isolated coercive elites are in a position to demand a share of regional power if a boss decides to compromise, but they lack the means and the ties to act collectively if a boss decides to confront them. Power-sharing can create a stable authoritarian regime, but it is only through the institutionalization of hierarchical authority and the creation compartmentalized organizations that a regime becomes durable and can avoid crises while promoting development. A durable regime is thus the product of a boss' decision to confront elites to redistribute power combined with the presence of tractable isolated coercive elites in society. This argument is tested through analytic historical cases studies of Mexico (1920-1997) and Bolivia (1952-1964), and extended to regimes in Iran, Argentina, and Malaysia.
Subject	:	Political science
Descriptor	:	Social sciences;Authoritarianism;Bolivia;Institutions;Mexico;Revolutions
Added Entry	:	Slater, Dan
Added Entry	:	Political ScienceThe University of Chicago