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BL
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| Record Number
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839023
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| Main Entry
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Maurer, Tim
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| Title & Author
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Cyber mercenaries : : the state, hackers, and power /\ Tim Maurer.
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| Publication Statement
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Cambridge, United Kingdom ;New York, NY ;Australia :: Cambridge University Press,, [2018]
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, ©2018
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| Page. NO
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xx, 246 pages :: illustrations, maps ;; 23 cm
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| ISBN
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1107127602
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: 110756686X
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: 9781107127609
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: 9781107566866
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| Bibliographies/Indexes
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Includes bibliographical references (pages 164-234) and index.
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| Contents
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Part one. Of brokers and proxies. Cyber proxies: an introduction -- (Proxies and cyber power -- What cyber proxies are (theoretically) capable of -- What cyber proxies are likely to be used for -- The pool of potential cyber proxies -- Proxy relationships and selected cases -- Proxies and the attribution problem -- A few words on methodology -- Conclusion: Cyber proxies and the bigger picture) -- Proxies: an instrument of power since ancient times -- (Framework for thinking about proxies -- Why proxy relationships exist -- Three main types of proxy relationships: delegation, orchestration, and sanctioning -- It's the relationship that matters) -- Cyber power: geopolitics and human rights -- (The bigger picture: sovereignty and information -- The US government's perspective -- The Russian government's perspective -- The Chinese government's perspective -- The Iranians government's perspective -- Cybersecurity is in the eye of the beholder).
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Part three. Implications: The theory: state responsibility and cyber proxies -- (A framework for cyber proxy relationships base on international law -- Due diligence -- Third countries and extraterritoriality -- International cooperation under pressure) -- The practice: shaping cyber proxy relationships -- (Keeping one's own house in order: determining inherently governmental functions -- Determining the role of the private sector -- Nationalism and hacktivism -- Nudging and managing instead of dictating and prohibiting) -- Conclusion: Cyber proxies, the future, and suggestions for further research.
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Part two. Cyber proxies up close. Cyber proxies on a tight leash: the United States -- (Private cybersecurity contractors -- Delegation under the spotlight: US Cyber Command and cybersecurity contractors -- Private cybersecurity contractors and internal security -- Predictable proliferation of capabilities) -- Cyber proxies on a loose leash: Iran and Syria -- (Orchestration under the spotlight: the US indictment of Iranian hackers -- Orchestration in wartime: the Syrian Electronic Army -- Unexpected escalation and limited options for response) -- Cyber proxies on the loose: the former Soviet Union -- (Sanctioning in peacetime: the 2007 DDoS attack on Estonia -- Sanctioning in wartime: the conflict in Ukraine (2014-today) -- Blitz orchestration: the war against Georgia in 2008 -- Sanctioning and mobilizing: the March 2017 US indictment of Russian hackers -- Sanctioning and statehood) -- Change over time: China's evolving relationships with cyber proxies -- (The rise of hacktivists in China and the government's passive support (1994-2003) -- The creation of militia units and the move toward orchestration (2003-13) -- Tightening control and aspirational delegation (2013-today) -- From broker state to (aspirational) monopolist).
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| Abstract
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Explores the secretive relationships between states and hackers. As cyberspace has emerged as the new frontier for geopolitics, states have become entrepreneurial in their sponsorship, deployment, and exploitation of hackers as proxies to project power. Such modern day mercenaries and privateers can impose significant harm undermining global security, stability, and human rights. These state-hacker relationships therefore raise important questions about the control, authority, and use of offensive cyber capabilities. While different countries pursue different models for their proxy relationships, they face the common challenge of balancing the benefits of these relationships with their costs and the potential risks of escalation. Maurer examines case studies in the United States, Iran, Syria, Russia, and China for the purpose of establishing a framework to better understand and manage the impact and risks of cyber proxies on global politics. --From publisher description.
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| Subject
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Cyberspace-- Political aspects.
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Cyberterrorism.
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Hackers.
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Hacking-- Political aspects.
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Internet and international relations.
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Technology and international relations.
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Cyberspace-- Political aspects.
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Cyberterrorism.
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Hackers.
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Internet and international relations.
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Technology and international relations.
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| Dewey Classification
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364.16/8
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| LC Classification
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HV6773.M38 2018
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HV6773.15.C97M383 2018
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| Parallel Title
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State, hackers, and power
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