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BL
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| Record Number
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842177
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| Main Entry
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Kirchhoff, Michael D.
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| Title & Author
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Extended consciousness and predictive processing : : a third wave view /\ Michael D. Kirchoff and Julian Kiverstein.
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| Publication Statement
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Abingdon, Oxon :: Routledge,, 2019.
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| Series Statement
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Routledge focus on philosophy
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| Page. NO
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1 online resource
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| ISBN
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1315150425
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: 1351367560
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: 1351367579
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: 1351367587
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: 9781315150420
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: 9781351367561
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: 9781351367578
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: 9781351367585
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1138556815
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9781138556812
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| Bibliographies/Indexes
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Includes bibliographical references and index.
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| Contents
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Cover; Half Title; Series Page; Title; Copyright; Contents; List of boxes, figures, and tables; Acknowledgements; Introduction; 1 The extended mind: three waves; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 First-wave extended mind; 1.3 Second-wave extended mind; 1.4 Third-wave extended mind; 1.4.1 Dynamic singularities and no fixed properties; 1.4.2 The flexible and negotiable boundaries of the mind; 1.4.3 Distributed cognitive assembly; 1.4.4 Diachronic constitution; 1.5 Summary; Notes; 2 From extended mind to extended consciousness?; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Sensorimotor enactivism and extended consciousness
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2.2.1 The no-magical-membrane argument2.2.2 The variable-neural-correlates argument; 2.2.3 An externalist account of the qualities of experience; 2.3 The DEUTS argument for extended consciousness; 2.4 The weak spot in sensorimotor enactivism: dreaming and imagining; 2.5 Clark and predictive processing; 2.6 Summary; Notes; 3 Extended dynamic singularities -- models, processes, and recycling; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Inferred fantasies; 3.3 The DEUTS argument reconsidered; 3.3.1 Dynamic singularities, embodied generative models, and generative processes
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3.3.2 Reusing extended dynamics in offline experience3.4 Summary; Note; 4 Flexible and open-ended boundaries -- Markov blankets of Markov blankets; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Hohwy on the Markov blankets of the mind; 4.3 Markov blankets: one or many; 4.4 The metamorphosis argument; 4.5 Nested Markov blankets and the boundary of the mind; 4.6 Summary; Note; 5 Expectation and experience: a role for cultural practice in precision estimation; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 The predictive processing account of sensorimotor understanding; 5.3 Seeing what you expect to see
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5.4 The cognitive assembly of consciousness5.5 The argument for extended consciousness from distributed cognitive assembly; 5.6 Summary; Notes; 6 Extended diachronic constitution, predictive processing, and conscious experience; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Diachronic constitution: towards a process theory of constitution; 6.3 The causal-coupling-constitution fallacy in third-wave extended mind; 6.4 Modal intuitions: the neural duplicate intuition and why it is wrong; 6.5 Summary; Notes; Concluding remarks; Bibliography; Index
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| Abstract
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In this jointly authored book, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein defend the controversial thesis that phenomenal consciousness is realised by more than just the brain. They argue that the mechanisms and processes that realise phenomenal consciousness can at times extend across brain, body, and the social, material, and cultural world. Kirchhoff and Kiverstein offer a state-of-the-art tour of current arguments for and against extended consciousness. They aim to persuade you that it is possible to develop and defend the thesis of extended consciousness through the increasingly influential predictive processing theory developed in cognitive neuroscience. They show how predictive processing can be given a new reading as part of a third-wave account of the extended mind. The third-wave claims that the boundaries of mind are not fixed and stable but fragile and hard-won, and always open to negotiation. It calls into question any separation of the biological from the social and cultural when thinking about the boundaries of the mind. Kirchhoff and Kiverstein show how this account of the mind finds support in predictive processing, leading them to a view of phenomenal consciousness as partially realised by patterns of cultural practice.
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| Subject
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Cognitive science.
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| Subject
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Consciousness.
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Philosophy of mind.
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Cognitive science.
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| Subject
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Consciousness.
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Philosophy of mind.
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| Subject
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PHILOSOPHY-- General.
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| Subject
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PHILOSOPHY-- Movements-- Humanism.
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| Dewey Classification
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128/.2
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| LC Classification
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BD418.3.K57 2019eb
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| Added Entry
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Kiverstein, Julian
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