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BL
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| Record Number
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860517
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| Main Entry
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Beni, Majid Davoody
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| Title & Author
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Cognitive structural realism : : a radical solution to the problem of scientific representation /\ Majid Davoody Beni.
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| Publication Statement
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Cham, Switzerland :: Springer,, [2019]
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| Series Statement
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Studies in brain and mind ;; volume 14
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| Page. NO
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1 online resource
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| ISBN
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3030051145
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: 3030051153
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: 9783030051143
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: 9783030051150
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3030051137
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9783030051136
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| Bibliographies/Indexes
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Includes bibliographical references.
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| Contents
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Intro; Dedication; Preface; Contents; Chapter 1: Introduction, a Radically Naturalist Solution to the Problem of Scientific Representation; References; Chapter 2: The Parting of the Ways; 2.1 On Regimentation; 2.2 The Received View of Theories; 2.3 The Semantic View of Theories; 2.4 Structural Realism and Its Varieties; 2.5 Cognitive Models of Science; 2.6 Unification of the Sciences Program; 2.7 Promoting Cognitive Structural Realism; References; Chapter 3: The Problem of Representation and a Formal Solution; 3.1 A Brief Historical Remark
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3.2 The Problem of Scientific Representation (The Weak Version)3.3 The Problem of Scientific Representation (The Strong Version); 3.4 The Mathematical-Physical Dichotomy; 3.5 Partial Structures and Pragmatic Truths; 3.6 Dissolving the Problem of Representation?; 3.7 The Problem of Representation, Philosophical or Formal?; References; Chapter 4: The Problem of Representation, Real Patterns, and Rainforests; 4.1 An Informational Solution to the Problem of Representation; 4.2 Floridi's Version of Informational Structural Realism; 4.3 Informational Structural Realism in the Rainforest
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4.4 Universalities and Renormalization Groups4.5 Real Patterns?; 4.6 Logical Depth as a Criterion for Individuation; 4.7 Complexity and Reality; 4.8 A Quick Recap; References; Chapter 5: A Rudimentary Version of Cognitive Structural Realism; 5.1 Launching Cognitive Structural Realism; 5.2 Addressing the Problem of Representation; 5.3 Connectionism and Cognitive Models; 5.4 Structuralist Elements of Churchland's Theory; 5.5 Realist Elements of Churchland's Theory; 5.6 From Stimulus to Science, a Premiere; 5.7 Going Beyond the RVT and the SVT; 5.8 Dealing with the Pessimistic Meta-Induction
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5.9 Dealing with the Problem of Underdetermination5.10 Proto-CSR's Solution to the Problem of Representation; 5.11 Proto-CSR, a Synthesis Between Cognitive Models of Science and Structural Realism; 5.12 Concluding Remarks; References; Chapter 6: An Advanced Version of Cognitive Structural Realism; 6.1 Some Preliminaries; 6.2 The Bayesian Mechanisms of Inferring the Structure of Reality; 6.3 Free Energy Principle and Evolutionary Considerations; 6.4 The Role of Action; 6.5 Difference-Based Coding and Structuralism; 6.6 Representing the Real World
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6.7 Inferential Links and Explanatory Inferences6.8 The Objectivity of Inferences; 6.9 Context Sensitivity; 6.10 Dissolving the Problem of Representation, a Kantian Approach; 6.11 A Modest Version of Structural Realism; 6.12 The Endurance of the Radical Scepticism About CSR's Account of Scientific Representation; References; Chapter 7: An Ecological Solution to the Problem of Representation; 7.1 The Problem of Representation Raises Its Head Again; 7.2 Diverging from Representationalism; 7.3 An Interlude; The New Developments in Ecological Psychology
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| Abstract
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In this book, the author develops a new form of structural realism and deals with the problem of representation. The work combines two distinguished developments of the Semantic View of Theories, namely Structural Realism (SR), a flourishing theory from contemporary philosophy of science, and Ronald Giere and colleagues' Cognitive Models of Science approach (CMSA). Readers will see how replacing the model-theoretic structures that are at issue in SR with connectionist networks and activations patterns (which are the formal tools of computational neuroscience) helps us to deal with the problem of representation. The author suggests that cognitive structures are not only the precise formal tools for regimenting the structure of scientific theories but also the tools that the biological brain uses to capture the essential features (i.e., structures) of its environment. Therefore, replacing model-theoretic structures with cognitive structures allows us to account for the theories-reality relationship on the basis of the most reliable theories of neurology. This is how a new form of SR, called Cognitive Structural Realism (CSR) is introduced through this book, which articulates and defends CSR, and shows how two diverging branches of SVT can be reconciled. This ground-breaking work will particularly appeal to people who work in the philosophy of science, philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences.
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| Subject
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Realism.
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Representation (Philosophy)
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Science-- Philosophy.
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Structuralism.
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Philosophy of mind.
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Realism.
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Representation (Philosophy)
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Science-- Philosophy.
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| Subject
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Structuralism.
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| Dewey Classification
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501
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| LC Classification
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Q175.32.S78B46 2019
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