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" Kant on maxims and moral motivation : "
Peter Herissone-Kelly.
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BL
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| Record Number
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860633
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| Main Entry
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Herissone-Kelly, Peter
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| Title & Author
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Kant on maxims and moral motivation : : a new interpretation /\ Peter Herissone-Kelly.
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| Publication Statement
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Cham, Switzerland :: Springer,, [2018]
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| Series Statement
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Studies in German idealism ;; volume 21
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| Page. NO
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1 online resource (x, 212 pages)
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| ISBN
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3030055728
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: 9783030055721
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303005571X
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9783030055714
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| Contents
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Intro; Dedication; Acknowledgments; Contents; Chapter 1: Introduction; 1.1 One Set of Intuitions, Two Problems, and One Challenge; 1.2 The Problem of Experiential Incongruence; 1.3 The Problem of Misdirected Moral Attention; 1.4 Meeting the Challenge: The Traditional Model and Its Interpretation; 1.5 Approaches and Limitations; References; Part I: The Traditional Model; Chapter 2: Maxims of Action; 2.1 The Will as a Capacity to Act in Accordance with Principles; 2.2 Kant's Maxims: Definitions; 2.2.1 Maxims as Subjective Principles; 2.2.2 The Generality of Maxims; 2.2.3 Maxims as Propositions
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2.3 The Logical Form of Kant's Maxims2.4 Richard McCarty's Account of Maxims of Action; 2.5 Maxims of Action in Kant's Other Works; 2.6 Summary; References; Chapter 3: Maxims, Ends, and Incentives; 3.1 The Nature of Ends and Incentives; 3.2 The Relation of Maxims to Ends and Incentives; 3.3 Kant's Maxims of Ends; 3.4 Contradictions in Will: One Final Possible Argument in Favour of ME; 3.5 Summary; References; Chapter 4: Deriving Actions from Laws; 4.1 Mapping the Route from Imperatives to Actions; 4.2 Deriving Actions from Maxims: The Kantian Practical Syllogism
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4.3 The Status of a Kantian Practical Syllogism's Conclusion4.4 Deriving Maxims from Laws: Imperatives and the Kantian Practical Polysyllogism; 4.5 Summary of Part I; References; Part II: Interpreting the Traditional Model; Chapter 5: Maxims and Reasons; 5.1 The Two Problems; 5.2 The Justificatory Conception of the Categorical Imperative and the Problem of Misdirected Moral Attention; 5.3 The Possession Conditions of Maxims, and a Maxim-Possessor's Reasons; 5.4 The Traditional Model and the Justificatory Conception; 5.5 Talbot Brewer on Maxims and Reasons; 5.6 Summary; References
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Chapter 6: Incentives, Practical Aspects, and Bare Situational Reasons6.1 From Incentive Incorporation to Moral Reasons for Action; 6.2 Incentive Reasons as Motivating Reasons; 6.3 O-Aspects and the Incorporative Act; 6.4 D-Aspects, Bare Situations, and Moral Ends; 6.5 The Problem of Experiential Incongruence, the Moral Law, and the Universalisability Test; 6.6 Summary; References; Chapter 7: The Kantian Good-Willed Agent and the World; 7.1 A Summary of Points; 7.2 Implications: The Good-Willed Agent's Relationship to the World; 7.3 Remaining Questions and Future Directions; References; Index
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| Abstract
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This book outlines and circumvents two serious problems that appear to attach to Kant's moral philosophy, or more precisely to the model of rational agency that underlies that moral philosophy: the problem of experiential incongruence and the problem of misdirected moral attention. The book's central contention is that both these problems can be sidestepped. In order to demonstrate this, it argues for an entirely novel reading of Kant's views on action and moral motivation. In addressing the two main problems in Kant's moral philosophy, the book explains how the first problem arises because the central elements of Kant's theory of action seem not to square with our lived experience of agency, and moral agency in particular. For example, the idea that moral deliberation invariably takes the form of testing personal policies against the Categorical Imperative seems at odds with the phenomenology of such reasoning, as does the claim that all our actions proceed from explicitly adopted general policies, or maxims. It then goes on to discuss the second problem showing how it is a result of Kant's apparent claim that when an agent acts from duty, her reason for doing so is that her maxim is lawlike. This seems to put the moral agent's attention in the wrong place: on the nature of her own maxims, rather than on the world of other people and morally salient situations. The book shows how its proposed novel reading of Kant's views ultimately paints an unfamiliar but appealing picture of the Kantian good-willed agent as much more embedded in and engaged with the world than has traditionally been supposed.
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| Subject
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Kant, Immanuel,1724-1804-- Ethics.
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Kant, Immanuel,1724-1804.
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Ethics.
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| Dewey Classification
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193
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| LC Classification
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B2799.E8H47 2018
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