|
" Philosophy and the 'dazzling ideal' of science / "
Graham McFee.
| Document Type
|
:
|
BL
|
| Record Number
|
:
|
862340
|
| Main Entry
|
:
|
McFee, Graham.
|
| Title & Author
|
:
|
Philosophy and the 'dazzling ideal' of science /\ Graham McFee.
|
| Publication Statement
|
:
|
Cham :: Palgrave Macmillan,, [2019]
|
| Page. NO
|
:
|
1 online resource (348 pages)
|
| ISBN
|
:
|
3030216756
|
|
|
:
|
: 9783030216757
|
|
|
:
|
9783030216740
|
| Bibliographies/Indexes
|
:
|
Includes bibliographical references and index.
|
| Contents
|
:
|
Chapter One Introductory -- A still point in a turning world? §1. Introduction: The 'dazzling ideal' of science §2. Priority in science: The possibility of an ordo cognoscendi §3. The six 'still points': Connecting persons, agency, and meaning §4. Meaning what we say: Normativity, responsibility and understanding §5. Wittgenstein, exceptionlessness & occasion-sensitivity §6. Sellars's two images of humankind §7. Philosophy and language again §8. Conclusion: The project of this work Chapter One References/Bibliography Chapter One Notes Chapter Two Persons as Agents: The Possibility of Genuine Action §1. Introduction: the 'free will' issue §2. Setting the scene §3. What is determinism? §4. Determinism as an issue for philosophy §5. Causality and exceptionlessness §6. Causality and agency §7. On Davidson's anomalous monism §8. Connections §9. Locating science in the 'action' debate §10. Conclusion: A therapeutic resolution Chapter Two References/Bibliography Chapter Two Notes Chapter Three What Persons Are: Identity, Personal Identity and Composition §1. Introduction to numerical identity §2. Five (quick) properties of numerical identity §3. What are the covering concepts? §4. Psychological discontinuity & multiple personality §5. Wiggins (1980) 'solution' §6. Hunting logical possibility §7. Some problems for problem-cases §8. Identity and composition §9. Conclusion Chapter Three References/Bibliography Chapter Three Notes Chapter Four What Persons are Not: Causality, Minds and the Brain §1. Introduction §2. The causal story of past behavior: causal sufficiency §3. Brain-states and behaviour §4. The problem of plasticity §5. Deploying the 'is' of composition §6. Reducing thoughts to brain states: six cases of a Bugatti Veyron §7. Contemporary science and the permanence of explanation §8. The body's role §9. The 'mereological fallacy', from Bennett & Hacker §10. Exceptionlessness in correlation: returning to 'other minds' §11. Wittgenstein's question about states and processes Chapter Four References/Bibliography Chapter Four Notes Chapter Five Evolutionary Explanation in Psychology: Not an Issue for Philosophy? §1. Introduction: Sketching the biology §2. The individual and evolution §3. The place of the individual in evolutionary theory §4. Genes (and memes) §5. Reasoning in evolutionary psychology §6. Dual-Inheritance theory §7. Conclusion Chapter Five References/Bibliography Notes Chapter Five Notes Chapter Six Persons, Artificial Intelligence, and Science Fiction Thought-Experiments §1. Introduction §2. The Turing Test §3. Searle's Chinese room §4. To be or not to be -- that is not the android's question §5. The Aphrodite Argument §6. Like a person? §7. Half-time score §8. Thought-experiments and Science Fiction §9. Blade Runner §10. Caught in the Turing trap? §11. The strange case of West World §12. Conclusion: An unfamiliar idea in Descartes Chapter Six References/Bibliography Chapter 6 Notes Chapter Seven Considerations of Exceptionlessness in Philosophy: or, 'Everything ... ' §1. Introduction: the problem §2. Ziff's cheetahs §3. Defeating disambiguation §4. 'All', 'every', and contexts §5. Conclusion Chapter Seven References/Bibliography Chapter Seven Notes Chapter Eight Philosophy without Exceptionlessness §1. Introduction: Thinking about cases lacking exceptionlessness §2. Parables, not propositions §3. A worked example: Practical constraints on free action? §4. Two constraints on practical freedom §5. A third constraint §6. Argument and 'the redeeming word' §7. Conclusion Chapter Eight References/Bibliography Chapter Eight Notes Chapter Nine Conclusion: The Place of Reason §1. Introduction: Truth, reason and responsibility §2. What science can and cannot offer §3. Reason, and the dangers of truth-denial, or relativism §4. Three comparisons in Descartes §5. Again, Sellars's two images of humankind §6. Sellars on what is real §7. Confronting the parochial §8. Conclusion Chapter Nine References/Bibliography Chapter Nine Notes.
|
| Abstract
|
:
|
Recent decades have seen attacks on philosophy as an irrelevant field of inquiry when compared with science. In this book, Graham McFee defends the claims of philosophy against attempts to minimize either philosophy's possibility or its importance by deploying a contrast with what Wittgenstein characterized as the "dazzling ideal" of science. This 'dazzling ideal' incorporates both the imagined completeness of scientific explanation--whereby completing its project would leave nothing unexplained--and the exceptionless character of the associated conception of causality. On such a scientistic world-view, what need is there for philosophy? In his defense of philosophy (and its truth-claims), McFee shows that rejecting such scientism is not automatically anti-scientific, and that it permits granting to natural science (properly understood) its own truth-generating power. Further, McFee argues for contextualism in the project of philosophy, and sets aside the pervasive (and pernicious) requirement for exceptionless generalizations while relating his account to interconnections between the concepts of person, substance, agency, and causation.
|
| Subject
|
:
|
Philosophy and science.
|
| Subject
|
:
|
Philosophy and science.
|
| Dewey Classification
|
:
|
100
|
| LC Classification
|
:
|
B67
|
| |