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BL
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| Record Number
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864836
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| Title & Author
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Game theory for security and risk management : : from theory to practice /\ Stefan Rass, Stefan Schauer, editors.
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| Publication Statement
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Cham, Switzerland :: Birkhäuser,, [2018]
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, ©2018
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| Series Statement
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Static & dynamic game theory : foundations & applications
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| Page. NO
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1 online resource :: illustrations
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| ISBN
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3319752685
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: 9783319752686
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3319752677
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9783319752679
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| Bibliographies/Indexes
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Includes bibliographical references.
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| Contents
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Intro; Preface; Acknowledgements; Contents; Contributors; Part I Theory; 1 Utilizing Game Theory for Security Risk Assessment; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Risk Assessment; 1.2.1 General Risk Assessment Phases; 1.2.2 Mapping Between the General Risk Assessment and Three Selected Approaches; 1.3 Game Theory for Security Risk Assessment; 1.3.1 Game Theoretical Steps; 1.3.2 An Example Elaborating the Game Theoretical Steps; 1.3.3 Mapping Between Risk Assessment and Game-Theoretic Approaches; 1.4 Cooperative Game to Address Opportunity Risks; 1.5 Discussion and Conclusion
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1.6 Chapter Notes and Further ReadingReferences; 2 Decision Making When Consequences Are Random; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Decision Making for Security: Loss Minimization; 2.2.1 A Total Stochastic Ordering Based on Moments; 2.2.2 Deciding the Stochastic Order; 2.2.2.1 Comparing Distributions to Numbers (Randomness vs. Determinism); 2.2.2.2 Distribution Mixes and Comparing Mixed Types; 2.2.3 Distributions with Infinite Support; 2.2.4 Implausible Comparisons; 2.3 Game Theory Based on; 2.4 Application of in Risk Management; 2.5 Extensions and Outlook; References
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3 Security Strategies and Multi-Criteria Decision Making3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Security Games with a Single Objective; 3.3 Multi-Objective Security Games; 3.4 Computing Equilibria and Security Strategies; 3.4.1 Solution by Linear Programming; 3.4.2 Iterative Solutions by Learning; 3.4.2.1 Failure of FP in Distribution-Valued Zero-Sum Games; 3.4.2.2 Restoring Convergence of FP; 3.4.3 FP for Multi-Goal Security Strategies; 3.5 Final Remarks; References; 4 A Scalable Decomposition Method for the Dynamic Defense of Cyber Networks; 4.1 Introduction; 4.1.1 Organization of the Chapter; 4.1.2 Notation
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4.2 The Security Model4.3 The Defense Problem; 4.3.1 Information State; 4.3.2 Sequential Decomposition and Dynamic Programming; 4.4 Approximation to the Defense Problem; 4.4.1 Local Defense Problems; 4.4.1.1 Preliminaries; 4.4.1.2 Functional Dependencies and the Notion of an Influence Graph; 4.4.1.3 Formulating the Local Defense Problems; 4.4.2 Approximating the Local Defense Problems; 4.4.3 Scalability; 4.5 Example; 4.6 Discussion and Conclusion; References; 5 Factored Markov Game Theory for Secure Interdependent Infrastructure Networks; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Mathematical Model
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5.2.1 Network Game Model5.2.2 Zero-Sum Markov Games; 5.2.3 Mathematical Programming Perspective; 5.2.4 Single-Controller Markov Game; 5.3 Factored Markov Game; 5.3.1 Factored Structure; 5.3.2 Linear Function Approximation; 5.3.3 Term Reorganization; 5.3.4 Restricted Information Structure; 5.3.5 Variable Elimination; 5.3.6 Distributed Policy of Attacker; 5.3.7 Approximate Dual LP; 5.4 Numerical Experiments; 5.4.1 Transition Probability and Cost; 5.4.2 Approximation Accuracy; 5.4.3 Various Information Structure; 5.4.4 Network Effect; 5.4.5 Optimal Policy; 5.5 Conclusion
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| Abstract
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The chapters in this volume explore how various methods from game theory can be utilized to optimize security and risk-management strategies. Emphasizing the importance of connecting theory and practice, they detail the steps involved in selecting, adapting, and analyzing game-theoretic models in security engineering and provide case studies of successful implementations in different application domains. Practitioners who are not experts in game theory and are uncertain about incorporating it into their work will benefit from this resource, as well as researchers in applied mathematics and computer science interested in current developments and future directions. The first part of the book presents the theoretical basics, covering various different game-theoretic models related to and suitable for security engineering. The second part then shows how these models are adopted, implemented, and analyzed. Surveillance systems, interconnected networks, and power grids are among the different application areas discussed. Finally, in the third part, case studies from business and industry of successful applications of game-theoretic models are presented, and the range of applications discussed is expanded to include such areas as cloud computing, Internet of Things, and water utility networks.--
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| Subject
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Game theory.
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Risk management.
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BUSINESS ECONOMICS-- Economics-- General.
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BUSINESS ECONOMICS-- Reference.
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Computer security.
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Game theory.
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Game theory.
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Operational research.
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| Subject
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Risk management.
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| Dewey Classification
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330.015193
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| LC Classification
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HB144
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| Added Entry
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Rass, Stefan
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Schauer, Stefan
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